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CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION
This article will attempt to articulate in a new fashion the
policies underlying the problem of when the benefit and burden
of covenants respecting use of land should run to remote parties.
In the course of this discussion, it will be necessary both to trace
the history of the development of the doctrines and to put them
in the framework of their present utility in a modern land use
control system. In addition, changes in the rules or in the proper
approaches to them will be suggested.
A.

BACKGROUND AND EARLY HISTORY

It was early apparent that unless agreements (contained in
deeds or leases) respecting the use of land were binding not only
upon the promisor (covenantor) who entered into them but also
upon purchasers from him, such undertakings would be worthless, since otherwise they could be avoided by a mere transfer to a
third party. It became imperative to set up rules which would
somehow bind remote parties to undertakings they did not make.
Likewise, unless such - agreements could be enforced by a suc-

1970]

PROMISES RESPECTING THE USE OF LAND

169

cessor to the one to whom the promise was made, the value of
the undertaking would be little, for as soon as the promisee
(covenantee) conveyed the property for whose benefit the covenant was extracted, the agreement would expire for the lack of
anyone to enforce it Thus, rules allowing enforcement by remote parties also had to be devised. A good part of the history of the law of covenants is made up of the development of the
rules allowing enforcement by and against parties other than
those who made the original agreement. This had to be done in
the face of rules against assignment of rights and delegation of
duties.' The terms "covenant running with the land at law,"
"equitable servitude" or "restrictive covenant" came into usage
to describe the kinds of interests that grew up in the English and
American land law systems in a sort of haphazard gimcrack
fashion in response to these old restrictive rules. The result was,
as we shall see, an unnecessarily complicated, cumbersome and
unpredictable complex of rules.
As noted above, the efficacy of covenants respecting the use
of land. would be greatly diminished if their burden could not
"run with the land" to the successor of the covenantor and their
benefit could not "run with the land" to the successor of the
covenantee. The meaning of the terms "the benefit runs" and
"the burden runs" can be shown in the following example: The
A Development Corporation, owner of a large tract containing
hundreds of parcels to be subdivided upon which houses are to
be built, sells its first parcel to B. The Corporation plans to leave
about 20 percent of the land for parks, bicycle ways and swimming and other recreational facilities for the common use
of the residents of the tract. To support the maintenance of the
common areas, the Corporation places a covenant in the deed to
B that "the grantee his heirs and assigns agrees to pay for a
period of 50 years an annual fee of $300 (or an amount later to
be assessed by a prescribed procedure) for the purpose of supporting the various expenses of the areas of the subdivision designated for common use." The A Corporation successively conveys
properties to C, D, E, etc., with the same covenant extracted
from each grantee. When it is said that the benefit of the covenant runs with the land of the promisee, it is meant that since
by hypothesis the covenant given by B was for the benefit of the
land still owned by the A Corporation, that anyone who subsequently purchases land which was still owned by the A Corporation when it originally conveyed to B may enforce that covenant

1. 3 S. WnmasToN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 405, 411 (3d ed. 1960).
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against B even though there is no express assignment of the right
to do so.2 Thus, in this particular case, C, D, E or any person
who purchases benefited property from the Corporation after
B does can enforce the covenant.
On the other hand when it is said that the burden of the
covenant runs with the land of B, it is meant that when B sells
his land to Z, Z is personally liable for performance of the covenant to pay the annual $300, and if he refuses to do so, suit may
be brought and judgment entered against him, with all his assets, including the real property in question, liable to execution in
satisfaction of that judgment. 3 In other words, Z would be liable
for all obligations under the covenant arising during his period
of ownership just as if he had entered into them himself. This
liability in personam should be contrasted with merely imposing
liability upon the land itself. As a practical matter what this
latter concept means is the judicial imposition of a lien upon the
real property leaving Z's other assets free from the obligation of
the covenant.4 Presently, it will be explained how these two
possibilities have been used and how they interrelate.5 For the
moment, it is enough to say that the term "covenants running
with the land at law" relates to the personal liability of Z upon a
promise he did not make and did not agree expressly to assume.0
As already noted, the rules that choses in action were not
assignable nor duties under contracts delegable stood in the way
of a system of running covenants. The first breach in these barriers came with respect to the running of benefits. Early in
history 7 before the statute Quia Emptores was passed, the very
essence of the lord-vassal relationship required the lord to
protect the title of the vassal. However, after the statute, when
it was no longer possible to subinfeudate and thus create a tenurial relationship between the grantor and grantee of a fee simple,
there was no implied warranty of title in a conveyance. Only if
2. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 541 (1944)
RESTATEMENT]; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §

[hereinafter cited as
9.19

(Casner ed. 1952)

[hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]

3.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 2, § 530; 2 A.L.P., supra note 2, § 9.18.
C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND

4. 2 A.L.P., supra note 2, § 9.17;
OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN

WITH LAND"

LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW

223-26

1176 (1966).

(2d ed.

1947); G.

See Cabell v. Federal

Land Bank of Spokane, 173 Ore. 11, 144 P.2d 297 (1943).
5. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra.
6. See Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes on Land,
28 VA. L. REV. 951, 961-69 (1942).
7. For a general discussion see 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 157-66 (3d ed. 1923) and 5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at pp.
3153 et seq.
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there was an express agreement between buyer and seller that
seller warranted the title, did the buyer get relief. A logical
question to follow was whether a purchaser from the original
buyer was entitled to the benefit of the express warranties made
to the original buyer. Could he sue the original warrantor, in
spite of the fact that the warranty was not made to him? The
courts held that a remote party could recover upon certain warranties from the original warrantor, but not upon the theory that
the cause of action could be assigned; rather it was viewed as if
the right to recover were somehow attached to the estate of the
owner of the granted premises. This theory was adopted later
with respect to covenants involving use of the premises. In Pakenham's Case,8 the plaintiff as successor in title to the covenantee sued the defendant priest whose predecessor had covenanted
to sing in the plaintiff's manor house once a week. The court
held that the plaintiff could enforce the covenant even though the
original agreement was not made with him. Thus the doctrine
of running benefits was extended from warranties of title to
covenants with respect to use of the land.
The running of the burden posed even more difficult problems analytically. There is a proper reluctance on the part of
courts to impose personal liability to perform a promise upon a
person who never made that promise. This reluctance continues
to this day and is embodied in the rule of some states against an
implied assumption of an assignor's duties by an assignee of a
contract.9
Historically, the burden of covenants was first allowed to
run when the covenantor was a tenant in a landlord-tenant situation. Thus, for example, the assignee of the tenant was liable
personally for. performance of the tenant's covenant to pay
rent. 10 Developing along with that doctrine was the corollary
that the assignee of the tenant could enforce any covenants of
the landlord made for the benefit of the tenant"
Neverthe8. Y.B. 42 Edw. III f. 3, pL 14 (1368). For discussion see CLARK,
supra note 4, at 121-24.
9. See 4 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 906 n.97 (1951). But the Restatement of Contracts § 164 adopted the rule that an assignment of "the
contract" operates as a promise by the assignee to perform. See also
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-210 (4) (1962 Official Text) for the same
rule.
10. Walker's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1587). The rule, of
course, survives. Burnett v. Irving Trust Co., 91 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 754 (1937); Paul v. Kanter, 172 So. 2d 26
(Fla. 1965).
11. Campbell v. Lewis, 106 Eng. Rep. 706 (K.B. 1820).
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less, although it was held that both the benefit and the burden
of covenants ran with the interest of the lessee, there was apparently the opposite rule with respect to the running of benefit and
burden attached to the landlord's interest. A statute was passed
the effect of which was to make both the benefit and burden of
covenants of the lessor run with the reversion. 1 2 Thus by the
end of the sixteenth century, a system of running benefits and
burdens had developed as to both the landlord and the tenant.

B. Spencer's Case-THE

LANDMARK-TOUCH AND CONCERN,

INTENTION AND PRIVITY

The most important case historically in the development of a
system of running burdens and benefits is Spencer's Case.'8
Plaintiff Spencer, the landlord, had leased realty to a tenant, the
latter covenanting for himself, his executors and administrators
that he, his executors, administrators or assigns would build a
brick wall on a part of the leased land. The tenant assigned his
interest to J who assigned to defendant. The defendant refused
to build the wall and plaintiff landlord brought an action of
covenant against defendant. The court held for defendant and
in a broad series of dicta laid down general principles for the
resolution of the issue of when a burden shall run with the land.
First, the court said, when the covenant extends to a thing in
being ("in esse"), the burden of the covenant shall run with the
land and bind the assignee even if there are no express words in
the instrument purporting to bind a later assignee. Second, and
on the other hand, if the covenant has to do with a thing not in
being, there must be express words evincing an intent to bind
the assignee. Third, the covenant will run and bind the assignee
only if it "touches and concerns" the lease property and is not
merely "collateral." And fourth, the covenant will run and bind
only those in privity of estate with the lessor and lessee.
Apparently on the basis of the fact that the tenant covenanted for himself, his executors and administrators and did not
in the very first instance mention the word "assigns," the court
held the covenant was not binding on the defendant, as the wall
was not in being.
The decision left open many questions. For example: What
12. 32 Henry VIII, c. 34 (1540). The statute was passed after the
redistribution of monastery lands, in order that the new grantees of
the king could enforce covenants contained in the leases of tenants
who occupied the land at the time of seizure.
13.

5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
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is-the meaning of the distinction between those things in being
and those not? Why should such a distinction be made? How
other than through the use of the word "assigns" does one evince
the intent that a covenant shall run? When does a covenant
"touch and concern" the land and when is it merely "collateral?"
Why should that distinction be made? What is meant by parties
in privity of estate with the lessor and lessee? How does the
rule requiring privity apply to a non-lease situation, e.g., one in-

volving the conveyance of a fee simple? Why should only privies
be bound? Why are not all persons in possession of the burdened
property bound, e.g., adverse possessors? The balance of this
article will be devoted to tracing the answers that history gave
to these questions and in many cases suggesting more rational
answers.
IE. INTENT OF THE PARTIES-NECESSITY FOR
USE OF THE WORD "ASSIGNS"
-The first and second rules of Spencer's Case dealt with the
problem of what express evidence of intent was necessary in the
instrument of conveyance before the burden could run to the
covenantor. The courts still universally state that before a covenant can run there must be an intention by the original parties
that it shall run. 14 Such an intent may be evinced by use of
the word "assigns" or by a clause stating expressly that the
burden and benefit of the covenant shall run with the land. On
the other hand, many instruments are silent on the issue. This
latter situation presents the court with a difficult construction
problem. The solution of Spencer's Case was to require an express statement of intention when the covenant has to do with a
thing in being and dispense with it when it did not. There is a
salutary tendency on the part of most courts to ignore or overrule
this old distinction. 15 Indeed there seems to be no logical basis
14. Intent required for running of benefit: Clem v. Valentine, 155
Md. 19, 141 A. 710 (1928); Hudspeth v. Eastern Ore. Land Co., 247
Ore. 372, 430 P.2d 353 (1967).
Intent required for running of burden: Glendale v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass'n, 2 Ariz. App. 379, 409 P.2d 299 (1965); Javna v. D.J.
Fredericks, Inc., 41 N.J. Super. 353, 125 A.2d 227 (1956). See also RSTATEmNT, supra note 2, § 531.
15. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, Ashburn, Sylvester &
Camefla-Ry., 91 Ga. App. 698, 87 S.E.2d 92 (1955); Sexauer v. Wilson,
136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907); Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St.
340 (1859). This position is supported by RESTATEmENT, supra note 2,
§ 531, comment c at 3197. A few states still retain the distinction in
Spencer's Case but these constitute a weak minority. See, e.g., Lowe v.
Wilson, 194 Tenn. 267, 250 S.W.2d 366 (1952).
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for it. The more modern approach is to infer intent by viewing
the "entire instrument as a whole."'
This article analyzes the above rules and deals with some
broader problems as well. What is considered here, in addition,
is whether and to what extent courts do, can and should look to
the intent of the original parties to the transaction to determine
if the covenant should run. And a further question may be
asked: should these rules be the same for the running of benefits
and burdens? As background for discussion of these issues it
would be well to state some of the many ways in which one could
manifest the intent that the benefit or burden shall or shall not
run. The parties to the original transaction:
(1) may neither have an oral understanding about the issue at
all nor have evinced any unambiguous intent about it in writing;
(2) may not have an oral understanding about the issue, but
still the written instrument contains unambiguous words relevant to the question;
(3) may have an oral understanding about the issue, but the
written instrument contains clear language expressing a contrary intent;
(4) may have an oral understanding about the issue with the
written instrument completely silent or ambiguous about it;
(5) may have an oral understanding which is unambiguously
incorporated into the written instrument.
Where the parties have not thought about the issues at all
and there is no unambiguous language in the instrument about it,
the courts, having no evidence written or extrinsic of the intent
of the parties, are left to inference. Where, by hypothesis, the
parties have no intent upon the issue, any inference about it
would be fictional. 17 Nevertheless, courts often purport to handle the issue on the basis of what the intent of the parties was.
The courts which ignore the "in being" test of Spencer's Case
look at "the instrument as a whole" or the "circumstances surrounding the transaction." One of these circumstances might be,
16. Peters v. Stone, 193 Mass. 179, 79 N.E. 336 (1906). See also
Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1966); Tower v. Mudd Realty
Co., 317 P.2d 753 (Okla. 1957). California courts hold that, as to the
running of the benefit, extraneous circumstances may not be considered
and the intention must be specifically expressed in the instrument In
order to run. Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919).
17. If the foregoing suggests that it is not the meaning or intention of the party to the contract that is in fact given legal
operation, but may be instead the meaning and intention that
some imaginary reasonable, prudent, and intelligent man would
have had (or, more realistically, the judge on the bench), we are
not disposed to deny it.
3 A. Comn, CoNTRAcTs § 536 (1960).
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for example, the existence of a common scheme. Parol evidence
is admissible to show these circumstances.' 8 When courts attempt to define "intent," they are actually, in disguised form,
making a policy decision affected by several factors: first, their
general predisposition in favor of or against the running of
burdens or benefits to remote parties; second, their determination
of whether the particular benefit or burden being considered is
normally thought to run, 19 and third, whether other objective
facts, such as a common scheme, which may tend to show an intent that the covenant run, are present.2 0 This matter will be
21
further discussed hereinafter.
Where the parties have no understanding with respect to the
issue of the running of the covenant, but the instrument contains
an agreement stating an intent, the court would usually be bound
by the writing, and contradictory parol evidence that there is
no such understanding would ordinarily not be admitted. The
same rule would apply where the parties have such an understanding but the written instrument contains clear language expressing a contrary intent. Whether expressed intent is and
should be respected by the courts is considered in the next succeeding paragraphs.
Where the parties have an oral understanding on the issue
of the running of the covenant that is unambiguously incorporated into the instrument, the problem of the legal relevance of
intent is posed in bold relief. First, let us examine some fact
patterns around which this issue may revolve, when there is express intent whether a benefit shall run. Suppose L leases
Blackacre to T, T agreeing to pay a certain rental and to keep
the premises in good repair. Suppose further that the lease says
that the benefit of the covenants shall not run with the reversion. Of course, in the normal situation such covenants do run
with the land to a new owner. Should A, the purchaser of
Blackacre from L be able to recover the rent from T? It would
18. Grange v. Korff, 248 Iowa 118, 79 N.W.2d 743 (1956); Hegna v.
Peters, 199 Iowa 259, 201 N.W. 803 (1925); Owenby v. Boring, 38
Tenn. App. 540, 276 S.W.2d 757 (1954).
19. As we shall see, this really means whether the covenant touches
and concerns the land. See text accompanying note 122 infra.

20. See 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY

673 at 169, 170 (Recomp.

1968) for Professor Powell's review of what factors the courts consider
in deciding the issue of intent. They include the retention or nonretention of adjacent land by the promisee-grantor and the fact that the
benefit does or does not render more valuable the retained land.
21. See text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.
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When A purchases the land

from L, he should be held to be on notice (constructive or inquiry) of the terms of the lease and the fact that he will not be
allowed to enforce the covenants. On the other hand, if there
was merely an oral understanding and there was no hint of this
understanding in the writing, parol evidence admitted to defeat
the normal understanding of a buyer and thus vary the terms
ought not be admitted as against innocent third parties. 23 It is
submitted that even in the case where there is an ambiguous attempt in the writing to defeat the normal expectations of the
parties, parol evidence tending to do so ought not be admitted.
In order for the parties to defeat these expectations there should
be a requirement of an unequivocal and unambiguous writing
to that effect.
Consider, now, the reverse situation. Assume T has agreed
as part of the rent to pay off a note owed by L to M. The benefit
of such an agreement would normally be deemed collateral and
would not run with the land.24

Suppose further that L and T

22. I have found no case that involved in the instrument itself
express language that the benefit of the covenant shall not run. There
are many cases that say and hold that an intention that the benefit
shall run is necessary, but the court is usually forced to infer intent
from other circumstances and the matter then becomes a carbon copy
of the court's process of deciding whether the covenant touches and concerns. Examples of such cases are: Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19,
141 A. 710 (1928); Toothaker v. Pleasant, 315 Mo. 1239, 288 S.W. 38
(1926).
In Hudspeth v. Eastern Ore. Land Co., 247 Ore. 372, 430 P.2d 353
(1967), the court said the language in the conveyance itself indicated
that the benefit of a covenant was not intended to run and the court
refused to allow it to run though it related to the land. However, the
only thing in the conveyance that evinced that intent was the fact that
with respect to another covenant the parties had used the words "successors and assigns" but with respect to the covenant in litigation there
was no such language.
23. The application of the parol evidence rule as against third
parties is considered in 3 A. CoRnN,

CONTRACTS

§ 596 (1960).

Professor

Corbin noted that there were many cases that seemed to say that parol
evidence might be inadmissible between the parties to a contract but
admissible when offered for or against a third party-the exact opposite
of the rule contended for here. Professor Corbin criticized that rule
and contended that the parol evidence rule should be applied to the
parties to the contract and third parties in the same way. However,
he was dealing with the typical case in which the issue was the rights
of the parties to the original contract in a litigation between one of those
parties and a stranger to the contract. Here, however, the issue is the
rights of third parties arising out of the contract. In this situation, the
normal expectations of the third party ought not be defeated by the oral
unexpected agreements of the original parties.
24. Dolph v. White, 12 N.Y. 296 (1855).
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agree that the benefit shall run with the land and there is an
unequivocal agreement to that effect in the lease. Now L sells
Blackacre to X and the deed to X makes no mention of the note.
Can X enforce the covenant? Can L enforce it? Admittedly the
hypothetical has very little practical significance because there
would, in this case, be very little reason for the parties to agree
that the benefit would run. Nevertheless, there seems to be no
reason why the benefit should not run with the land. There
are cases, however, which hold that the covenant cannot run if
25
the promise is collateral, even if the parties intended it to run.
Intent with respect to the running of burdens should be
separately analyzed. Using the landlord-tenant hypothetical, assume that the parties agree and the lease contains an unambiguous clause that the duty to keep the premises in repair shall not
run with the land. In the usual circumstances, the burden of
such a covenant would run;26 that is, the covenant touches and
concerns. As to the original parties and the tenant's assignee this
case poses no particular problems. Certainly the latter would
not complain of being relieved of the burden and the original
landlord having agreed expressly to the arrangement would obviously be bound by it. Even the landlord's assignee, who assumedly took with knowledge of the contents of the lease, should
be held to be bound. On the other hand, assume there were no
clause to that effect or that there was an ambiguous one. Could
the tenant's assignee bring in parol evidence of the understanding
that the duty to repair shall not run? It would seem that he
should be able to against the original landlord as long as it does
not contradict any express terms of the agreement and as long
as the court does not find that the lease was intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement
(that is, that this would not violate the parol evidence rule).
However, in any event the oral agreement should not be binding
against the landlord's assignee. Again, parol evidence should not
be admitted against a person not party to an agreement which
varies the normal expectations of individuals in the position of
landlord or tenant, unless the unexpected term is unambiguously incorporated into the instrument of lease.
25. Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 3 N.E. 282 (1885); Shade v. TV.
O'Keeffe Inc., 260 Mass. 180, 156 N.E. 867 (1927); Masury v. Southworth,
9 Ohio St. 340, 348 (1859). See also Neponsit Property Owners'
Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938);
Morgan Lake Co. v. New York, N.H. &H. R.R., 262 N.Y. 234, 186 N.E. 685
(1933); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 854 n.85 (3d ed. 1939).
26. See cases collected in 41 A.L.R. 1371 (1926) and 1 H. TiFrANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 126 n.57 (3d ed. 1939).
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Lastly, let us assume a case where the "parties by agreement
attempt to make the burden run where it normally would not
run with the land. L leases Blackacre to T and T agrees to keep
L's property next door to the leased premises in good repair. The
parties agree in the lease that the burden of the covenant shall
run to any assignee of T. T assigns the lease to A, who refuses
to keep the property next door in repair. May L or his assignee
enforce against A? The standard principle stated by the courts
is that a covenant cannot run with the land even if the parties so
intend unless the other legal requirements (such as touch and
concern) are met.27 Since the covenant does not touch and concern the demised premises, the burden would not run, and A
would not be bound under the decided cases. Is this a sound result? If A is aware of the terms of the lease can he not be said to
have assumed the obligations thereof, very much as the grantee
of a deed containing covenants purporting to bind him has, by
his acceptance of the instrument which he has not signed, signified acceptance of and agreement to those covenants? Courts
which say that such covenants do not run are clearly emphasizing the enforcement of the "normal" undertakings of the usual
parties over the specific undertakings of the parties before it.
Perhaps the justification for this is a natural reluctance to impose burdens on parties who have not expressly agreed to undertake them. By imposing this limitation upon the effectuation of
intent, the courts are refusing to bind a person to unusual undertakings unless he has expressly agreed to be bound. Perhaps the
courts are correct in requiring that A expressly agree to the
covenant before he is liable. The only result, after all, of holding
that the covenant does not run is that A is not automatically
bound; an express undertaking by A would still be enforced.
In summary, there is an oft-stated and often ignored requirement that there be an intent that the covenant shall run before
it does run. Quite often, there is nothing in the instrument that
indicates one way or the other whether the covenant shall run.
In that situation some courts under the guise of dealing with intent really manufacture it and base their decision on other relevant policies, particularly, as we shall see, the policy underlying
touch and concern. 28 Also quite often, the only evidence of in27. Kettle River R. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N.W.
469 (1889); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Webster, 106 Tenn. 586, 61 S.W. 1018
(1901); Blasser v. Cass, 158 Tex. 560, 314 S.W.2d 807 (1958); C. CLARK,
supra note 4, at 96 n.10; H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 854 nl. 84-85
(3d ed. 1939).

28. See Section IV, Part A infra.
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tent is the clause binding heirs, administrators, executors and
assigns. The use of the word "assigns" is the simplest way of
evincing the intent that the covenant shall run. Intent becomes
relevant where it is expressed in the instrument. If the expressed intent accords with the usual intent of parties in the situation, 29 it will always be respected. On the other hand, if the
expressed intent is contrary to what the courts view as the usual
situation they will:
(1) refuse to follow an intent that the benefit or burden
shall run and
(2) follow an intent that the benefit or burden shall not run.
Courts are generally on sound ground in following an intent that
a benefit or burden shall not run, unless that intent is unexpressed or ambiguously expressed and innocent assignees' rights
would thereby be defeated. It is difficult to justify a court's
refusal to allow the benefit of a collateral covenant to run where
the intent to have it do so is clearly expressed; but there are
sound policy reasons in support of the general position against the
running of the burden of such a covenant without the express
undertaking of the party to assume the burden.
Ill.

THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT

It is universally agreed that "privity of estate" is necessary
in order for the burden or the benefit of a covenant to run with
the land at law. The first problem in this area is just defining
what the term "privity" means. Over this there is a great deal
of disagreement, which is more than just semantic. The varying
views lead to rather profound differences in legal result. It is
the purpose here to define the differing views, state their effect
on practical affairs and then opine which if any of them commends itself to a modem system of conveyancing.
There are four different views of the definition of privity
of estate.30 First, in a few of the states it is said that there must
be a tenurial relationship between the original parties to the
covenant and between the remote parties who are involved as
plaintiff and defendant in a suit to enforce the covenant.31
29. The doctrine of "touch and concern," we shall see, is the underlying policy which gives effect to community understanding and expectation or the usual intent. See text infra at pp. 206-07.
30. See generally 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY g 674 (Recomp. 1968).
31. Costigan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 54 N.J.L. 233, 23 A. 810 (1892);
McIntosh v. Vail, 125 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943). Some of the
states require tenurial privity for the running of the benefit See,
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Hereafter this will be denominated "tenurial privity." The practical effect of this requirement is to confine enforcement at law
of covenants by and against remote parties to cases involving
landlord-tenant or life tenant-reversioner relationships and their
assignees. This, the most restrictive view, eliminates from the
possibility of running to remote parties, covenants extracted in
the conveyance of a fee simple in the sale of real property. The
rule has its basis in English history. Spencer's Case, 2 the ancient
decision on the running of covenants, involved a landlordtenant relationship and laid down a requirement of a privity
without defining what it meant. Two hundred years later in
33
Webb v. RusseJU
the court said, "It is not sufficient that a
covenant is concerning the land, but in order to make it run with
the land, there must be privity of estate between the covenanting
parties." Again this statement was ambiguous because, involving
as it did a landlord-tenant relationship, it was not clear whether
privity of estate meant a continuing tenurial relationship or an
instantaneous relationship such as occurs in the conveyance of
a fee. The English view as it was later amplified was that only a
tenurial relationship sufficed. 3 4 Thus, in England there was no
doctrine of running burdens at law with respect to conveyances
in fee, though benefits were allowed to run. This English view
was too restrictive in its practical operation and necessitated the
invention of the "equitable servitude" to allow the running of
the benefits and burdens of restrictive or negative covenants
regulating the use to which land conveyed could be put. This de3
velopment will be traced more extensively later. 1,
As an alternative to the first, the second or "simultaneous interest" view of privity is only slightly less restrictive. Massachusetts follows this rule requiring that the covenantor and
covenantee have a continuing and simultaneous interest in the
same piece of property.3 Thus, the tenurial relationship of landlord and tenant would, as in the first view, satisfy the requirement. However, in addition, the conveyance or reservation of an
e.g., 165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F.2d 813

(2d Cir. 1941) (dictum); National Union Bank v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173
(1877). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 534, 548; Annot., 68
A.L.R.2d
32.
33.
34.

1022 (1959).
5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
3 T.R. 93, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1789).
Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).

35. See text accompanying notes 48-58 infra.
36.

Shade v. M. O'Keeffe, Inc., 260 Mass. 180, 156 N.E. 867 (1927);

Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. 459 (Mass. 1837); Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449
(Mass. 1837). See also C. CLARK, supra note 4, at 128-29.
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easement would provide the necessary privity for the running of
benefit or burden to remote parties. Thus, if A conveys Blackacre to B also conveying to B a right of way over Whiteacre, A's
retained premises adjoining, and in the same instrument B his
heirs and assigns agree to pay A his heirs and assigns a perpetual
rent of $100 per year as rental for the easement, the burden
of the covenant would run with Blackacre to B's successors in interest and the benefit of the covenant would run with Whiteacre
to A's successors in interest. If the simultaneous interest view is
followed strictly, conveyances in fee unaccompanied by the creation of an easement could not give rise to a covenant binding upon
or benefiting persons not party to the original conveyances. The
Massachusetts courts, feeling somewhat limited by their own doctrines of privity have, it has been pointed out, rather freely resorted to the doctrine of spurious easements to fill the gap.37
The state of acceptance of this rule in the few states that have
cited the Massachusetts rule with approval is in doubt because
there has not been much recent litigation upon the issue.3 8
In yet a third group of states it is sufficient that the original
covenantor and covenantee are connected in a mere instantaneous grantor-grantee relationship. A, owner of Whiteacre and
Blackacre, adjoining tracts, conveys Blackacre to B and extracts
a covenant that B shall pay an annual fee to A and his assigns for
maintenance of common areas. Under this view the successor of
A can enforce the covenant against the successor of B. This we
shall call the "instantaneous horizontal privity" approach. Of
course, in such states, the requirements of privity are also fulfilled if there is the requisite tenure or mutual relation as defined in the first and second group of states. The vast majority
of states seem to favor this third approach,3 9 though it has been
40
severely criticized.
The fourth view requires no relationship between the cove37. C. CLARK, supra note 4, at 135, 252-53. See Whittenton Mfg. Co.
v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441, 29 L.R.A. 500 (1895); Inhabitants
of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co., 160 Mass. 267, 35 N.E.
780 (1894).
38. See 5 R. PoWELL, REAL PaoPERTY 674 n.14 (Recomp. 1968).
Professor Powell lists Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Texas as in varying degrees following the Massachusetts approach.
39. See 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 674 n.16 (Recomp. 1968) for
a collection of the cases.
40. Judge Clark criticized the rule as the requirement of a barren
formality which could be evaded by the simple expedient of a conveyance to a straw man and back. The criticism is obviously a valid one.
See C. CrAR, supra note 4, at 116-21.
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nantor and covenantee other than the contract itself. The only
requirements are that there be privity of estate between the covenantor and the person against whom enforcement is sought and
likewise between the covenantee and the party seeking enforcement.4 1 This is the so-called "vertical privity" requirement.
The practical effect of this view is to dispense with the requirement of a conveyance between the original parties. Thus, assume
that A and B are next-door neighbors and that they sign a contract in which each agrees to pay the expenses of the maintenance
of a dam which controls the flow of water through both their
properties. Assume further that A sells his property to X and
that B sells his property to Y. Under this fourth view, X and Y
can enforce the covenant against each other in spite of the fact
that there was no privity of estate between A and B.
Is there any situation in which this fourth requirement of
privity will prevent the running of a burden or benefit? Assume that X in the above hypothetical acquired title from A
by adverse possession rather than by deed and all other facts are
the same. X could neither enforce the covenant against Y nor
could Y enforce it against X. 42 There are other cases that fall in
the gray area between the two extremes of a conveyance in fee
from A to X and the acquisition of title by adverse possession by
X. Suppose X gets title through purchase at a foreclosure sale
of the interest of A. Or, what if X is the heir, devisee or mortgagee of A? Should X then be bound personally upon the engagements of A? In the first three examples, courts have generally held that X is personally bound.43 The courts tend to view
the case of the mortgagee differently, depending upon whether
it is from a lien or title jurisdiction, holding no liability in the
former and liability in the latter, but only after the mortgagee
44
has the right to possession.
41. Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N.W. 874 (1883);
Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 A. 706 (1890). This is the view favored
by Judge Clark. See C. CLARK, supra note 4, at 131-37. The Restatement
adopts this view with respect to the running of the benefit only. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 547, 548.
42. The authority for this proposition is sparse, though it is generally accepted to be the rule. The issue is discussed in Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Possession, 33 YALE L.J. 285, 291-92; C. CLARK, supra
note 4, at 136; 0. HOLMES, COMMON LAW 403 (1881). The Restatement
accepts the rule. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 547, comment d, § 535.
43.

Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 fll. 362, 161 N.E. 756 (1928)

(liability

of original covenantor's devisee); Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Priest, 131
Ind. 413, 31 N.E. 77 (1892) (liability of covenantor's successors through
purchase at foreclosure sale); Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass.
1937) (liability of covenantor's heirs).
44. Merchants' Union Trust Co. v. New Philadelphia Graphite Co.,
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In addition, the requirement of privity between the covenantor and his successor has great vitality in the landlord-tenant
situation. That is, if the tenant-covenantor has subleased rather
than assigned his interest to a successor the requisite privity between the landlord-covenantee and subtenant is not present.
This is on the theory that the subtenant has a tenurial relationship to the tenant, who in turn has such a relationship with the
landlord, there being no tenurial relationship between landlord
and subtenant. This distinction will be discussed in a later section. 45
It should be noted that the requirement of the fourth viewthat of succession between the covenantor and the party sought
to be sued and of succession between the covenantee and the party
seeking to enforce-applies as well to those states following any
of the more restrictive views. Thus, assume the following facts
arising in a state following the third theory (which requires a
conveyance between covenantee and covenantor). A conveys
Blackacre to B and includes in the conveyance an agreement by
B to build a wall separating Blackacre from Whiteacre, which
are premises retained by A. X gets title to Whiteacre by adverse possession and Y gets title to Blackacre by the same means.
The benefit of the covenant does not run to X nor does the
burden of the covenant run to Y so as to impose personal liability
upon him. In other words, the mere fact that there was the
requisite privity between the covenantor and covenantee is not
sufficient. There must likewise be privity between the original
parties and the parties to the suit, normally through the succession of conveyances.
Another variable to the privity problem should be noted
here with respect to the running of benefits. It has become
rather typical in the case of the planned unit development to
have common areas such as walkways, parks and swimming
facilities for the exclusive use of and solely supported by the
owners of the land in the developments. In order to have the
funds for the maintenance of these facilities, a covenant is inserted in the deed to each owner that he will pay a yearly
charge to an association to be formed for the purpose of caring for
10 DeL Ch. 18, 83 A. 520 (1912), involving a lien jurisdiction, where the
mortgagee does not become liable until he purchases at a foreclosure
sale; Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331
(1934), involving a title jurisdiction, where the mortgagee becomes liable only after default by mortgagor. See generally RESTATEMZNT, supra
note 2, § 535, comment d.
45. See Section III, Part B, Subsection 5 infra.
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these areas. The rules of privity are an obvious barrier in the
way of enforcement; clearly the association has no ownership
interest in any piece of land. However, in recognition of the fact
that enforcement of a money obligation for the benefit of all
is impractical, there have been a few cases that have recognized
the utility of such a device in promoting effective land use and
allowed the association to enforce in spite of its lack of privity
of estate. 46 Of course, where the association has already been
formed and it is expressly given the right to enforce in the deed,
the court could allow it to prevail on a third party beneficiary
47
theory.

A. THE GROWTH OF THE DocTRmNE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
As was noted earlier, application of the strict English view of
privity requiring a tenurial relationship between the parties
posed serious practical problems. The fact that burdens could
not run at law in conveyances in fee to parties remote from the
agreement would have effectively prevented use of the covenant
to set up a consensual system of land use control. This was also
apparent to the Lord Chancellor of England, who, in 1848 in the
famous case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 48 effectively avoided the privity
hurdle in certain kinds of cases by casting the issue in different
terms. Plaintiff was the owner of certain property and sold a
piece of it to one Elms. The deed contained a covenant that
Elms would not use the property for any other purpose than as a
square garden. Elms sold the property and it passed by mesne
conveyances into the hands of the defendant. Defendant's deed
contained no such covenant but he admitted that he had notice
of the covenant when he purchased the property. Plaintiff sued
to enjoin defendant from building upon the land in violation of
the covenant. In holding that plaintiff was entitled to his injunction the court said:
It is said that, the covenant being one which does not run with
the land, this Court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not
whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party
shall be permitted to use the land in the manner inconsistent
with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice
46. Neponsit Property Owner's Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank,
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). See also Twin Lakes Improv. Ass'n
v. East Greenacres Irrig. Dist., 90 Idaho 281, 409 P.2d 390 (1965), where
an association of property owners was allowed to bring a class action
and the doctrine of Neponsit was not discussed; 2 A.L.P., supra note 2, §
9.20 nn. 10-11.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 541, comment c.
48. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
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The court thus framed the issue not as a running covenant problem but as whether a court of equity will permit someone who
buys land with notice of a restriction upon it to violate that restriction.
The effect of this decision was to initiate a system of running
benefits and burdens in equity, counterpart to the one already
existing at law. At law, the inflexible requirements of form, intention, touch and concern and privity applied. But in the court
of equity some of the rules concerning formalities5" and all of
the requirements of privity 5 ' were, as the rules evolved, deemed
inapplicable. 52 This was not the only difference, however; there
was also a difference in remedy. As mentioned above, the effect of saying that the burden runs with the land at law was that
a successor in privity with the covenantor was bound personally
to perform the covenant, that is, to pay the assessment or build
the fence, etc. If he did not do so, he was personally liable for
damages just as if he himself had made the promise. This was
not true in equity. Historically the equitable servitude first announced in Tulk v. Moxhay evolved around the so-called restrictive covenant, a promise that the land shall be used only in a
certain way, e.g., for residence purposes. The Chancellor did not
have to impose personal liability in damages to protect the
covenantee or his successor. Instead, he used a remedy traditional to his jurisdiction, the injunction. He merely enjoined the
defendant from using the property in violation of the covenant.
Thus, in fiction if not in fact, the courts of equity avoided imposing liability as a promisor on remote parties. All they said they
were doing was enjoining the violation of an agreement by a remote party who had notice thereof when he purchased. Hence,
after some vacillation the rule developed in England that the
doctrine of equitable servitudes applied only to negative and
49. Id. at 1144.
50. For example, in some states the requirement of a writing complying with the statute of frauds has been deemed inapplicable on the
theory that equitable servitudes are contractual interests rather than
property interests. See 2 A.L.P., supra note 2, § 9.25 at 406 and cases at
n.8 therein.
51. That no privity is necessary in equity between the original
covenantor and covenantee see 2 AL.P., supra note 2, § 9.26. That no
privity is necessary between covenantee and his successor see id. § 9.27.
That no privity is necessary between covenantor and his successor, see
id. § 9.31.
52. The manner in which equity dealt with the touch and concern problem will be treated in a later section. See text accompanying notes 118-21 infra.
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not to affirmative covenants.53 In this country, the courts are
split, some courts holding that affirmative covenants may run in
equity and some holding not.5 4 Needless to say, a distinction
between affirmative and negative agreements can break down
in the gray area between the two. Would there always be a substantial difference between an agreement not to build for commercial or industrial uses and a promise to erect a residence, and a
residence only, sometime within the next fifty years? More importantly, should the rules about the devolution of these agreements be different? The usefulness of the distinction between
affirmative and negative agreements will be discussed in a later
section. 55
Parenthetically, one point should be emphasized. The English doctrine of equitable servitudes was based on notice. In that
country (which had no recording system) notice had to mean
principally actual notice. In this country which has had a welldeveloped recording system since its beginning, the record was
deemed to be notice to the subsequent purchaser, and thus so
long as the agreement was recorded, it was a stable and sure way
to bind subsequent parties to private land use arrangements.
Besides the injunction, the court of equity has a second
remedy at its disposal-the lien. If the covenant to pay money
does not run with the land at law because of a failure of privity
as locally defined, or because of the absence of the locally required seal or signature by the grantee, the court, instead of imposing personal liability to make payment upon a remote party,
may decree a lien upon the land which may be foreclosed in
equity.5 6 This does not involve the liability of an individual for
53.

Cooke v. Chilcott, 3 Ch. D. 694 (1876)

allowed affirmative

covenants to run in equity. Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Soc., 8 Q.B.D.
403 (1881) held to the contrary.
54. The old rule proclaiming the non-enforcement of affirmative
covenants in law or equity was established in Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y.
127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). This holding still has some support, as in
Furness v. Sinquett, 60 N.J. Super. 410, 159 A.2d 455 (1960) (dictum),
but the weight of modern authority is in favor of equitable enforcement
of affirmative covenants. See Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States,
278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960); Fitzstephens v. Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344
P.2d 221 (1959). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 528, comment a
(1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
55. See Section III, Part B, Subsection 2 infra.
56. Fresno Canal & Irrig. Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53
(1889) (failure of privity); Everett Factories & Terminal Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 15 N.E.2d 829 (1938) (failure of
grantee to sign deed); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319,
41 N.E. 441 (1895) (failure of grantee to seal); Child v. C.H. Winans Co.,
119 N.J. Eq. 556, 183 A. 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) (failure of tenurial
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a promise he did not make; rather it is the attachment of an obligation to the property burdened. Where the deed contains an
express provision for a lien or a statement that the land is
bound, there seems ample reason to allow this mode of enforcement. But where there is no such express provision, there is the
obvious question of whether the court ought to impose an implied lien on the land in order partially to circumvent the strict
and outmoded requirements of local law and thus allow the
covenantee some relief. There is authority that does imply a lien
under those circumstances. 57 There is also some authority which
allows both a lien and personal liability where all the requirements for the running of an affirmative covenant are met and
there is an express provision binding the burdened land as well.5 8

B. Pmin-= AT LAW ANm EQUrF-A CRIcAL VIEW
1.

The Present Complexity

The total effect of the historical development just outlined
was to create two parallel systems of running benefits and burdens, one at law and one in equity. The problems did not disappear with the merger of the courts of law and equity. Rather
the merged courts administered the two systems together under
one roof. Before making a critical evaluation of the duality, it
would be well to state more precisely in summary the practical
effects of the present system. An example will help clarify the
complexities. Assume A Corporation, a residential developer,
sells Blackacre, a house and lot which is part of a large development, to B and extracts in the deed to B the following covenants:
(1) that B shall use the premises for residence purposes only;
(2) that B shall build and keep in good repair a sidewalk along
the street which abuts Blackacre, and (3) that B shall pay to the
privity) (semble); University Gardens Property Owners Ass'n v. Steinberg, 40 Misc. 2d 816, 244 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Dist. Ct. 1963) (failure of
privity).
57. Everett Factories & Terminal Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers
Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 15 N.E.2d 829 (1938); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v.
Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895); Child v. C.H. Winans Co.,
119 N.J. Eq. 556, 183 A. 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936). See also RESTATEAimT, supra note 54, § 540, comment c; cf. 2 AEracAN LAW OF PROPEnI=
§ 9.17 (Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.]. On the question
of whether a lien ought to be implied see text accompanying notes 152-53
infra.
58. Burton-Jones Development, Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich. 122, 117
N.W.2d 110 (1962). One court has even implied a lien where there was
an express enforcible covenant held binding upon subsequent parties
as well. Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So. 2d 418 (1958).
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A Corporation $200 per year for the creation and maintenance of
common parks and swimming facilities for the development. The
deed further provides that the burden of all the above covenants
shall run with the land conveyed. A sells other parcels in the
tract to purchasers subsequent to B, viz., to C, D, E, F, G, etc.
through W, with the identical covenants. Assume alternatively
that B later sells Blackacre to X or that X acquires Blackacre by
adverse possession. X refuses to build a sidewalk or pay the
assessment and plans to build a greenhouse on Blackacre. Now
A Corporation and C sue X (as grantee or adverse possessor)
to enforce each of the above covenants. The complexity of the
legal situation may be summarized as follows:
a.

The Restrictive Covenant

(1) In a suit by C against X to enforce the covenant that the
premises be used for residence purposes only, C may clearly get
an injunction in equity against construction of the greenhouse
whether X is in privity with B by having taken a deed or is just
an adverse possessor. There is no necessity of privity in equity.
(2) If X has already built the greenhouse, A Corporation or
C may recover damages at law as a means of enforcing the
covenant assuming X is in privity. Whether X is in privity depends on the view of the jurisdiction involved. In no state would
an adverse possessor be deemed to be in privity. But even if X
had purchased the property from B, he would not be deemed to
be in privity if the state follows either the tenurial or the simultaneous interest view; on the other hand, if the state follows the
instantaneous horizontal privity view, X would be in privityand therefore liable for damages.
If X is an adverse possessor and therefore not in privity, most
courts would refuse to give damages because the covenant is enforcible only in equity where that remedy is not available, except as ancillary to an injunction. Here injunction is not available
because of plaintiff's laches.
(3) The lien theory would be unavailable against X on
breach of the restrictive covenant. The lien is viewed as appropriate only if the promise is for the payment of money.
b. The Covenant to Pay an Annual Assessment
(4) If X is a grantee and A Corporation sues to recover the
annual assessment, A would recover in those states following the
two more liberal views of privity outlined above. In the states
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following either of the more restrictive views, X would not be
liable at all. If, on the other hand, X is an adverse possessor, A
Corporation could not recover at law because of the failure of
privity.
(5) If A Corporation sues to recover the money in equity
where the defense of lack of privity would be unavailing, even to
an adverse possessor, he would be met by yet another defense,
viz., that equity will enforce only a negative covenant and that
enforcement of affirmative covenants such as a promise to pay
money is restricted to the courts of law. This view is accepted in
some states and rejected in others.
(6) A Corporation can also sue in equity to foreclose a lien
which it would argue the court of equity should imply from the
promise to pay money. Again it can be seen that the argument of
a lien in equity would be a device to avoid the requirements of
privity at law. And that is precisely the argument that X would
pose against recognition of the lien. That is, the privity requirements at law should not be circumvented by a fictitious implication of lien in a court of equity. As noted above, there is some
authority for the implication of a lien. The cases upholding a
lien, however, involve for the most part an express reservation
thereof.
c.

The Covenant to Build and Keep in Repair a Sidewalk

(7) If C sues X at law to enforce the covenant to build a
sidewalk, his relief would, of course, be in damages, the measure
of which would appropriately be discussed elsewhere. The privity problems as in (2) and (4) above would present the same substantial barriers.
(8) If C sues in equity, his relief would normally be a mandatory injunction, an order compelling X to perform the agreement, that is, build the sidewalk upon pain of contempt. Again,
C could be met with the same problems as in (5). Though lack
of privity is not a defense in equity, X could successfully raise in
some jurisdictions the defense that equity will not enforce an
affirmative covenant.
(9) A lien theory would be unavailing to C because the
promise is not to pay money.
Needless to say, legal complexity is necessary and defensible only when the human affairs being regulated are themselves
so interwoven with complex underlying facts and interests that
application of a simple set of rules to them would often result in
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substantial injustice. It would be useful to analyze whether the
intricacy of the above described rules serves any useful purpose
other than that of keeping lawyers profitably employed.
2.

The Requirement of Vertical Privity-A CriticalView
(Herein of the Distinction Between Affirmative and
Negative Covenants and of the Rights and Liabilities
of Adverse Possessorsand Other Non-Privies).

The question for discussion here is the soundness of the requirement at law that in order for enforcement to be had by or
against parties remote to the original agreement there must be
"privity" between that remote party and his predecessor in interest. As a practical matter this means that adverse possessors
and mortgagees are treated differently in law than in equity with
respect to their rights and liabilities under covenants. It is
worth pausing to examine this difference in treatment to see if
there is any justification for it. First, consider the enforcement
of the burden of covenants against an adverse possessor. If an
injunction is available in equity against an adverse possessor to
prevent his use of land in a way which is prohibited by a nega59
tive covenant of which he has actual or constructive notice,
then why should he not be bound at law by a promise to perform
an affirmative act where he has similar notice? Aside from any
historical or technical reasons, is there any policy of the law that
would tend toward these at least superficially inconsistent results? A justification that might be posed is a salutary reluctance to impose personal liability to perform a promise upon one
who has not made that promise and has no consensual arrangement with one who has. But why then should one not be similarly reluctant to enforce a promise not to do something? A possible answer is that the remedies present a different kind of magnitude of burden.6 0 It is one thing to forbid a person from doing
a prohibited act and it is another to force him to commit an affirmative one. But this argument is somewhat specious. It
is really the economic cost of the burden that normally measures
its onerousness. Would an adverse possessor be more burdened
by a promise to restrict land to residential uses than by a promise
59. It has been noted, note 48 supra, that the privity requirements
have not been applied in equity. That an adverse possessor is bound
to a restrictive covenant in equity see In re Nisbet and Pott's Contract,
1 Ch. 391 (1905), aff'd, 1 Ch. 386 (1906); RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, §
539, comment c.
60.

See
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CLARK,
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"RUN WiTH LAND" 210-12 (2d ed. 1947).
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to pay a small sum of money annually or to keep certain sidewalks in repair? The answer to that question would of course
depend upon the use to which he desired the land to be put.
If he desired to build a plant upon the premises, then he would
concede that an affirmative promise might run with the land
to an adverse possessor but a negative promise should not--the
exact opposite of the actual state of the law. In answer to that it
might be said that in the usual case the burden of an affirmative
promise would be greater and that the law is merely taking into
account the normal situation. Proof or disproof of this contention is in the realm of speculation, but probably the opposite
would turn out to be true both in terms of frequency of occurrence and economic impact upon the situation. Therefore,
unless some other policy can be articulated to justify a different
treatment of the two types of covenants with respect to the adverse possessor, the rules about them should be assimilated.
Another justification for the distinction is that covenants
tend to clog the title to property and thereby hamper its alienability. Therefore, any rule which prevents its running to remote
parties is beneficial in that it tends toward termination of the
covenant. This argument proves too much, however. If it is allowable to have the burden of a covenant run to a purchasergrantee, the normal situation, then why should it not run to an
adverse possessor, who usually has paid no consideration for the
property and is a comparatively rare bird anyway? A further
flaw in this argument is the fact that restrictive covenants are
just as much a clog on title as affirmative ones and they are permitted to run to adverse possessors. Therefore, affirmative covenants should also do so.
The answer to the last argument suggests another line of inquiry. Is there something in the nature of restrictive covenants
that makes it more desirable from a policy standpoint to have
them run to remote parties as compared to affirmative covenants? The function of the restrictive or negative covenant is to
make relatively permanent arrangements, which can be relied
upon, concerning the use to which land in a certain area can be
put. From the perspective of neighboring landowners, enforcement of such a covenant is extremely important. Indeed, it could
be argued that prospective enforcement of such covenants actually tends to make land more alienable because people would
be unwilling to invest large sums in land construction unless they
were reasonably sure that surrounding uses would be compatible. On the other hand, the affirmative covenant accompanying
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a conveyance in fee also has great modem utility, in connection
with cluster or planned residential development as well as in
other cases. 61 The modem developer often resorts to the use of
an annual assessment to support common areas such as parks,
swimming pools and golf courses which are for the exclusive use
of the residents of the development. The use of such devices
would be inhibited by rules limiting the running of burdens to
successors of the covenantor. From the standpoint, then, of the
modern utility of having the burden of affirmative or negative
covenants run to remote parties, there seems to be little to choose
between the two devices. A rule subjecting adverse possessors
to personal liability for performance of all covenants of which
he has notice, actual or constructive (record notice) would have
the virtues of simplicity, ease of administration and sound pol62
icy.
On the other side of the coin, the rights of an adverse possessor who has taken over property benefited by a covenant ought
to be considered. The distinction that appears to be tenuously
established is that the adverse possessor may not enforce affirmative covenants at law because of the lack of vertical privity
(privity between himself and the covenantee) 6 3 but may enforce
negative covenants in equity where the privity requirement is
dispensed with.6 4 Again the same questions arise as in the
burden analysis. Is there any policy reason that might be posed
to justify the difference in treatment? Why should an adverse
possessor be able to enforce a negative agreement benefiting his
land but not an affirmative one? The problem is of course different here because we are inquiring about the rights of the
wrongdoer, not his liabilities. In the burden inquiry it certainly
made very little sense to worry too much about imposing an obligation upon a person who acted wrongfully in any case. But
should the adverse possessor by his wrongdoing succeed to all
61. Judge Clark pointed out that affirmative covenants reported in
the actual cases seemed to be almost entirely restricted to four types of
promises: (1) to repair certain structures of the covenantee; (2) to
adjust rights in party walls; (3) to adjust rights in water and for the
payments of charges relating thereto, and (4) to pay assessments covering the above. Id. at 211. Certainly each of these devices has
some social utility.
62. Taking this position were Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse
Possession, 33 YALE L.J. 285, 292 (1924) and C.

136.

CLARK,

supra note 60, at

RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 547, comment d.
64. Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 190, 2 N.E. 946, 948 (1885)
(dictum); RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, § 487, comment e; 2 A.L.P., supra
note 57, § 9.27.

63.
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the rights of the party whose property he has taken? The requirement of privity at law does serve as a way of limiting how
much the wrongdoer can acquire by his act. However, merely
viewing the problem from the standpoint of the blameworthiness
of the adverse possessor's acts is somewhat simplistic. First, most
adverse possession cases do not involve situations where there is
an outright attempt to "steal" the property from the owner.
More typically they arise from a boundary dispute where the
mala fides of the taker is much less obvious.
Second, even assuming the bad faith of the adverse possessor,
one should look more deeply at the typical arrangements involving affirmative covenants before deciding whether, in justice,
the benefit should run. Commonly, transactions involving an
affirmative burden from one party to the other also involve reciprocal burdens on the other side. A hypothetical case will illustrate the point. A, owner of Blackacre, conveys the easterly part
of it to B. There is a source of water on the westerly or retained
part of the tract to which the conveyed piece has no access. In
the deed to B, A agrees that he will supply so many gallons of
water per day to B in return for a payment by B of $1,000 per
year. X wrongfully occupies A's tract for the statutory period
and becomes owner. Should X be able to enforce the obligation
to make annual payment against B? It would seem from what we
have said above that the burden to supply the water should pass
to X even though he is an adverse possessor. (The rule is, of
course, the contrary.) If we go so far, then it would seem to follow that X ought to be able to enforce the reciprocal obligation
which was given in exchange for the obligation that is binding
upon him, or else B, by fortuity would escape from his obligation. If, on the other hand, the old rule is followed that X is
not bound to supply the water, then of course he ought not to be
able to enforce the obligation to pay. In the vast majority of
cases of affirmative covenants there are such reciprocal arrangements and therefore this analysis should apply. Where the arrangement is not reciprocal, then a much better argument for
non-enforceability could be made.
3. Privity Between Covenantor and Covenantee-A Critical
View
a. Running of Burden
The rule in most states in the United States requires privity
of estate between covenantor and covenantee (horizontal privity)
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in order for the burden to run to remote parties at law. As
noted above, 5 some courts define this so as to require a tenurial
relationship between the original parties, others require a simultaneous and continuing interest such as an easement in the same
tract and still others require only a conveyance between covenantor and covenantee. In equity, however, no such requirement, however defined, has been imposed. No relationship
between the original parties to the covenant other than the
agreement itself is required. The next question appropriate to
our inquiry is, which of the differing views in law or equity
commends itself to a sound conveyancing system, and again
whether or not the legal and equitable approaches ought to be
assimilated.
What is the function of the rule at law that there must be a
tenurial relationship between covenantor and covenantee before
the burden can run? Its practical effect is to eliminate the running of affirmative agreements where there has been a conveyance in fee and confine them to the landlord-tenant situation.
Such a rule has the virtue of ease of application but it is doubtful that it has any other. It can be defended on the theory that
the burden of a covenant, if it were to run, would constitute a
cloud on title and thereby tend to hamper the alienability of
land. The answer to this has already been stated: restrictive
covenants which are much more common also tend to cloud the
title and no such privity is required to make their burden run. If
this requirement of privity is unnecessary with respect to the
more commonly used device then, a fortiori, it is unnecessary in
the less common one. The same arguments and answers thereto
may be stated with respect to the less restrictive views of privity
at law. They are still less liberal than the "anything goes" view
of equity and are difficult to justify as a means of preventing
clouds on title. We have also shown above that both the affirmative covenant, commonly enforced only at law, and the negative
one, commonly enforced in equity, have substantial utility in a
modern conveyancing system. Among other things, that system
has the goal of effectuating the intent of the parties to a transaction to the extent that such effectuation will not interfere with
another policy of the law.
Finally, it can be urged that the concept of privity is just a
response to the judicial instinct requiring a jural nexus, a connection between plaintiff and defendant before legal liability
65.

See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
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can be imposed."" But the legal connection is found in the covenants respecting the land to which the parties agreed and with
respect to remote parties in their possession of land known actually or constructively to be burdened. For these reasons it would
appear that the requirements of privity between the original parties to the transaction have no sound basis in any recognizable
legal policy and are really a mere survival of the technicalities
of an outmoded era. A rule dispensing with all requirements of
privity with respect to the running of burdens would be salutary.
Liability should be premised on the taking of title to property
with notice of the burden attached to it by its former owner.
b. Running of Benefit
There is even less reason to require privity of estate between
the original parties (horizontal privity) for the running of benefits than there is for the running of burdens. There is a much
weaker argument that the running of benefits hampers alienability more than does the running of burdens. On the contrary,
the running of the benefit tends to make the property more desirable and therefore more readily acceptable in the market place
(although, of course, it tends to make the burden on the other
parcel last longer). It would seem, therefore, that the rule requiring horizontal privity for the running of benefits should be
abolished, for the same reasons that were advanced for its abolition with respect to burdens. The case law still seems to require
horizontal privity though there seems to be limited authority
following the Restatement view that horizontal privity is required for the running of burdens but not for the running of
67
benefits.
4. The Running of the Benefit Further Considered-Subsequent
and PriorGrantees
It would be profitable to return to a consideration of the subdivision development hypothetical in which the A Development
Corporation successively conveys to B, C, D, . . . through W certain parcels in the same tract all subject to the same agreements
by the grantees. The focal questions are two: under what circumstances can W enforce a covenant against B, and under what
circumstances can B enforce a covenant against W?
66.

See R. POUND, TE SPIRIT op TE CoMmoMO

C. CLARK,

67.

LAW 22 (1921);

supra note 60, at 117.

See

RESTATEmNNT,

supra note 54, §§ 534, 548; 2 A.LP., supra

note 57, § 9.11 nn. 11-15 and cases cited therein.
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a. Subsequent Grantee Enforcement Against Prior Grantee
When the A Corporation conveys the first parcel to B, one
might well draw the inference that the covenant extracted from
B was for the benefit of whoever owned, or in the future would
own, the land that A Corporation retained when it made the conveyance. Thus W, a subsequent purchaser of A's retained land,
should be able to enforce a covenant that touches and concerns
his land against B. 61 The courts have generally agreed but have
imposed a requirement that there be shown an intent between
the original parties to the transaction (A Corporation and B) that
the covenant run.69 This intent may be shown in the instrument
by use of the word "assigns" 70 or by an express clause designating
the benefited land. 71 Or the intent may be shown by proof of
extrinsic circumstances such as the uniform building plan (common scheme) 72 or the fact that the retained land is benefited by
enforcement of the covenant. 73 To the extent that courts use the
last approach they are, as will be seen, applying a touch and
concern test and are being redundant. A few courts have reached
the same kind of result by indulging in a presumption that the
benefit is intended to run if it touches and concerns the retained
land. 74 It would seem that the courts ought to allow the benefit
to run in any case where it touches and concerns the retained
68. For an excellent discussion of this point see Doerr v. Cobbs,
146 Mo. App. 342, 123 S.W. 547 (1909).
69. Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935); De Sanno

v. Earle, 273 Pa. 265, 117 A. 200 (1922); Appeal of J.C. Grille, Inc.,
124 A.2d 659 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956). See also 2 A.L.P., supra note 57, §

9.29 n.1.
70. Halle v. Newbold, 69 Md. 265, 14 A. 662 (1888); Olson v.

Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super. 380, 130 A.2d 650 (App. Div. 1957).

71.

Packanack Lake Club v. Alexander D. Doig Dev. Co., 72 N.J.

Super. 360, 178 A.2d 243 (Ch. Div. 1962); Chesebro v. Moers, 233 N.Y. 75,
134 N.E. 842 (1922).
72. McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1953).
See also

McRae v. Lois Grunow Mem. Clinic, 40 Ariz. 496, 14 P.2d 478 (1932);
Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 25 S.E.2d 276 (1943). However, the
building plan must be in existence at the time the covenant was entered into to be evidentiary of the original intent of the parties. See 2
A.L.P., supra note 57, § 9.29 at 418 and nn. 15-19 therein.
73. Carlson v. Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950); Clem v.
Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 141 A. 710 (1928).
74. Lawson v. Lewis, 205 Ga. 227, 52 S.E.2d 859 (1949); Watrous

v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885). There are cases, however,
to the exact contrary which create a presumption that the covenant
was intended to be personal or impose a burden upon the person so
asserting to show that the covenant was intended to run with the land.
See, e.g., Hendlin v. Fairmont Const. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 310, 72 A.2d 541
(Ch. Div. 1950); Brehmer v. City of Kerrville, 320 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959).
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land unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. Otherwise, the normal expectations of a subsequent purchaser could
be defeated by a parol understanding of which he could have no
knowledge. The only reason to restrict the running to remote
parties would be to cut down the number of enforcible covenants
on the ground that they constitute a cloud on title. In view of
our comprehensive system of running covenants, such a policy
does not really fit in with the realities of prevalent practice.
Before we turn to that, however, one parenthetical point
ought to be made. The classic analysis that there is an obvious
distinction between the situation where a prior grantee is seeldng
enforcement against a subsequent one, and the reverse case, is
stated almost invariably by the text writers. It is often true that
courts refuse to put the cases in the neat theoretical categories
that are devised by the writers and other judges. This is such a
case. If one examines the cases carefully, he will find that the
courts often do not mention the prior/subsequent distinction and,
even more revealing, often state the facts in such a way that
the reader cannot tell whether the plaintiff is in a prior or subsequent chain. 7 5 It would seem that there is substantial authority
(sub silentio) that the rules about prior and subsequent party
enforcement are identical.
b. Prior Grantee Enforcement Against Subsequent Grantee
The more difficult problem for analysis is to determine under
what circumstances a prior grantee or his successor in interest
can enforce a covenant against a subsequent grantee or his successor. Using the hypothetical posed above, when can B enforce
a covenant extracted from W by A Corporation, their common
grantor? Under traditional analysis, the difficulty lies in the
question of intent. When a common grantor extracts a covenant
from his first grantee, there is, as mentioned above, a strong inference that he is doing it for the benefit of the nearby land he
still owns, and therefore when he conveys to a second grantee,
the courts find it relatively simple to say that the new owner of
the land intended to be benefited can enforce the covenant. But
an inference that the common grantor wanted to benefit the land
owned by the plaintiff is more difficult to draw when the prior
grantee seeks enforcement against the subsequent one, for the
75. See, e.g., Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.2d 733 (1956);
Fortner v. Gulf Refining Co., 316 S.W.2d 65 (CL App. Ky. 1958);
Club Manor, Inc v. Oheb Shalom Congregation, 211 Md. 465, 128
A.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1957).
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obvious reason that at the time of the common grantor's later
conveyance he did not own the allegedly protected land and
would ordinarily have no particular desire to benefit it; ordinarily, that is, because if the common grantor is a subdivider who
is attempting to promote the sale of a residential development, his
intent likely would be to benefit all the land in the development
so that it becomes more readily saleable. A discussion of the law
can therefore be conveniently subdivided into two areas: first,
the case where there is a subdivision development in which the
covenant is more or less uniformly extracted by the developer
from each buyer (the so-called common scheme) and second, a
simple conveyance of two adjoining pieces in which no multitract development is involved.
i.

Common Scheme

Several lines of authority have developed around the question of the extent to which the presence of a common scheme
gives the prior (or subsequent) purchaser the right to enforce
against all other grantees. The most liberal group of cases seems
to hold that if there is a common scheme, any grantee may enforce the common covenant against any other grantee. 7 A second group of decisions starts with the same rule but attaches to
it an additional requirement, that the party seeking enforcement
must prove the existence of the scheme by showing that the common grantor and purchasers intended to establish the scheme or
to benefit all owners in the subdivision. 77 The distinction between the first and second approaches is that in the former, no
proof of intent is necessary; all that is apparently required is that
the developer rather uniformly extract the covenants.
A third view is probably only a carbon copy of the second
but is in form at least a different statement of the rule. The
courts adhering to this view require both a scheme and an intent
by the original owner and purchasers that the restrictions be for
76. Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1958); Waterhouse v. Capital Investment Co., 44 Hawaii 235, 353 P.2d
1007 (1960); Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.2d 733 (1956); Fortner v. Gulf Refining Co., 316 S.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. Ky. 1958).
77. Rieger v. Wessel, 319 S.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. Ky. 1958); Club
Manor, Inc. v. Oheb Shalom Congregation, 211 Md. 465, 128 A.2d 405
(Ct. App. 1957); Mission Covenant Church v. Nelson, 253 Minn. 230,

91 N.W.2d 440 (1958); Olson v. Jantausch, 44 N.J. Super. 380, 130 A.2d
650 (App. Div. 1957). It should be noted that the same court may shift
back and forth between opposing views. Witness the Kentucky court
in this and the preceding footnote.
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the. benefit of all other lots7s In both approaches the requisite
intent may be shown by the "language of the instruments, the
conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances."" It
is apparent that the second and third approaches are essentially
the same. Both impose an intent requirement-the former to
establish the existence of the scheme, the latter in addition to it.
The difference is really nominal because the basic idea underlying the scheme is to benefit all lots in any case.
The fourth and strictest view requires that the existence of
the scheme be disclosed in the instruments of conveyance made
by the common grantor. Under this view, it is not enough that
all parties knew a common scheme was intended; rather the
deeds themselves must provide for mutual enforcement.80
Which of these views commends itself to a sound system of
running covenants? Surely none of them is ideal, although the
first is probably the best. Perhaps a more thorough analysis will
clarify the issues. What purpose does the intent requirement of
the second and third approach serve? First, it may be said that it
offers great flexibility, in that the court, in any case it wishes, in
order to reach a just result, is free to hold that the intent requirement has or has not been met. This of course has its virtues, but
where this approach is used to defeat the obvious understandings
of the parties it is of doubtful worth. In many cases this seems
to have been exactly what occurred."' Second, and more importantly, it can be argued that the intent requirement tends to
conform legal result to party expectations and thereby to prevent covenant enforcement against a person who reasonably does
not expect it. Certainly'it is unfair to enforce a covenant against
a person who bought property reasonably believing that enforcement of a certain covenant could not be had against him except
by the original grantor. What, then, is wrong with a properly
administered intent requirement? The real difficulty seems to be
that in the vast majority of development (or common scheme)
cases everybody really understands that the covenants restricting
use are contemplated as mutually enforcible by all owners in the
subdivision. Therefore, it seems that the courts which require
78. Bouley v. City of Nashua, 106 N. 74, 205 A.2d 34 (1964).
79. Id. See also cases cited in note 72 supra.
80. Palermo v. Allen, 91 Ariz. 57, 369 P.2d 906 (1962); Werner v.

Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919); Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d
579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958).
81. See, e.g., Club Manor, Inc. v. Oheb Shalom Congregation, 211 Md.
465, 128 A.2d 405 (1957); Bouley v. City of Nashua, 106 NI. 74, 205
A.2d 34 (1964).
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affirmative proof of intent of mutual benefit are starting with
the wrong presumption. Rather, the parties asserting that there
was no such understanding should be forced to convince the trier
of fact upon a preponderance of the evidence that it did not exist.
And, if a successor to the prior grantee is involved as plaintiff,
there should be a requirement that the original deed in the latter's chain of title contains clear language that the benefit of the
covenant does not extend to lands then unsold by the common
grantor. If this were not so, the plaintiff's normal expectations
could be defeated by an agreement of which he likely would have
no knowledge. The result of the application of such a rule would
be very close to the rule followed by some courts giving automatic mutual enforcement where a common scheme has been
shown. This is because in the usual case there will be no oral or
written understanding that the owner of the prior granted land
cannot enforce the covenant against a subsequent purchaser or
his successor. In any case, the courts following the first view
would probably take cognizance of an actual understanding of
8 2
non-enforcibility if such a case were to arise.
Consider the situation where there is a common scheme but
in a few of the conveyances the common grantor has omitted to
extract a covenant that has otherwise been uniformly extracted.
Can the covenant be enforced against a person whose back title
does not contain the promise, on the theory that he was put on
notice of its existence by the uniform appearance of the neighborhood? In the leading case of Sanborn v. McLean,83 the
court held that he was so bound. The court used the label "reciprocal negative easement" (or implied reciprocal servitude in
the terminology of the American Law of Property) to reach that
result. In language that is undoubtedly much too broad the
court said:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained,
the servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing
forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. For want of a better
descriptive term this is styled a reciprocal negative easement.8 4
The court seemed to be saying that whenever A burdens granted
land with a covenant in a conveyance to B, A's retained land
nearby is similarly burdened. Such a doctrine has never been
82. See, e.g., Fortner v. Gulf Refining Co., 316 S.W.2d 65 (Ct. App.
Ky. 1958); Jones v. Lambert, 298 S.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. Ky. 1957).
83. 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
84. Id. at 229-30, 206 N.W. at 497.
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generally accepted and does not deserve to be. However, when
read in the context of the facts the court was dealing with, that
part of the opinion makes a great deal more sense because there
was a common scheme involved. In the common scheme, there
certainly is an implicit understanding that all the other lots under
the control of the common grantor will be similarly burdened.
This would not normally be true where an individual is just subdividing his lot.8 5
The more important issue raised by Sanborn is: assuming
land in a common scheme can be subjected to a covenant where
there is neither written nor oral undertaking to do so, should an
innocent purchaser who buys such land be held to notice of the
covenant by reason of the uniform physical appearance of the
area and should he therefore be bound by the covenant even
though it does not appear in his own back title. There are several
other cases that have gone so far as to impose this liability, 8
but their propriety is doubtful. It appears that this doctrine
places far too great a burden upon the buyer in a development.
If other buyers in the development want to make sure that the
covenants imposed upon them are also imposed upon others, they
can insist that the deeds to them expressly impose the covenant
upon land retained by the grantor, or they can demand the recording of a separate instrument that binds all the land owned
by their grantor. What the Sanborn doctrine does is to impose
a burden of search beyond the grantee's own back title and even
beyond a search of other deeds not in the chain of title purporting
to bind his property. It requires him to search the record for
covenants which apparently have absolutely no connection with
the very land with which he is involved or to sense the existence
of the covenants by noting the uniform appearance of the area.
To require the record search of other tracts is to place upon the
searching process a great burden, which a little precaution by
others could have avoided. To require the purchaser to sense the
existence of the covenant by reason of uniform appearance is to
ignore the reality of the situation. In the usual case it is the developer himself who is building the house. It is natural to expect
that he will build according to some preconceived uniform plan,
85. In Mission Covenant Church v. Nelson, 253 Minn. 230, 91 N.W.
2d 440 (1958), the court held that the doctrine of the Sanborn case
implying a reciprocal obligation upoii the grantor would be applied
only where there is a common scheme.
86. Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955); Stark v.
Robar, 339 Mich. 145, 63 N.W.2d 606 (1954); Indian Village Ass'n v.
Barton, 312 Mich. 541, 20 N.W.2d 304 (1945).
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whether filed or not. The burden should be upon the developer
to insert the covenant into the record in a way that it can be
easily found. Recording a declaration of covenants covering the
entire area or filing a map which referred to the covenants would
be sufficient. The integrity of the record would be better served
by a rejection of this part of the Sanborn case. There is authority
87
that takes this view.
ii.

No Common Scheme

There is a line of authority which states that there can be no
prior-purchaser enforcement at all without the existence of a
common scheme.88 The Restatement takes a contrary view, as
do some cases.8 9 It is submitted that the limitation of enforcement to cases where there is a common scheme is unduly restrictive. If the parties to the second transaction desire to make a
covenant for the benefit of a prior party, there seems no reason
to deny the latter enforcement on a third party beneficiary
theory even without a common scheme. But consider the case
where the parties in the second deal do not so agree, and the
grantee in the prior transaction extracts an oral promise from
the common grantor that the latter will insert a covenant similar to the one binding the grantee on any subsequent deal made.
Where there has been a common scheme, the courts have generally not hesitated to impose the covenant on the subsequent
grantee even where it was not inserted in the later deed through
which the plaintiff claims. This has been done on the theory of
the "implied reciprocal servitude" of which the grantee is deemed
to have notice if the covenant has been inserted in most of the
87. Frisch v. Rutgers Village, 8 N.J. Super. 392, 73 A.2d 83 (Ch. Div.
1950) (semble); Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954). In

the latter case, the court does say the grantee of a parcel with no covenant extracted would not be bound in the absence of knowledge or
notice of the scheme on the part of the grantee in the deed for such
omitted lot but does not really define what such knowledge or notice
would consist of. From the facts of the case it appears, however, that
the court would not have accepted the doctrine of notice from mere
physical appearance of uniformity, for it seemed to reject as evidence of
notice a brochure published by the developer which described some
of the covenants relating to the land.

88. Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935) (semble); Roberts v. Scull, 58 N.J. Eq. 396, 43 A. 583 (Ct. Ch. 1899); Bessette v. Guarino, 85 R.I. 188, 128 A.2d 829 (1957); 2 A.L.P., supra note 57,
§ 9.30 n.5; 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY % 679 n.38 (Recomp. 1968).
89. Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957); Rodgers v.
Reimann, 227 Ore. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961); 5 RESTATEMENT, supra note

54, Servitudes, intro, note, ch. 46, p. 3244.
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deeds and the development's appearance gave notice of the covenant's existence. This rule was criticized above. Where there is
no scheme there is no similar difficulty. The rule ought to be
that unless the subsequent party had actual notice of the existence of the oral agreement before he took, he should not be
bound at the instance of the prior grantee.. Almost every case
involving the implied reciprocal servitude has involved a common scheme. The case of Rodgers v. Reimann0 has accepted the
theory of implied reciprocal servitude with prior-party enforcement where there is no common scheme but with the proviso
that the subsequent party must have notice of the oral agreement.
This approach seems sound. There is no reason to inhibit priorparty enforcement which has been assented to by all parties involved.
One other point should be made. One of the difficulties in
the area is the smoke-screen laid by all the terms and theories
used by courts and text writers beclouding what is essentially a
simple problem. The American Law of Property, for example,
points to the incorporeal property or negative easement theory,
the contract theory, the trustee theory, the third party beneficiary theory and the implied reciprocal servitude theory in
trying to make sense and order out of prior-party enforcement.0 1
Rather, the issue should be looked at from the point of view of
describing which combination of operative facts should result in
allowing prior-grantee enforcement. So viewed, the rule should
be that prior-grantee enforcement would be allowed when: (1)
the subsequent grantee both received a deed containing the covenant sought to be enforced and had notice of the existence of a
common scheme; or (2) the prior grantee and common grantor
had an agreement providing for insertion of such covenant, of
which agreement the subsequent grantee was aware, or (3) the
subsequent grantee expressly agreed to such enforcement.
5. Privity of Estate and Contract in Landlord-Tenant LawLiability of Tenant after Assignment and The Distinction
Between Assignment and Sublease
As was noted earlier, the rule became established that when
L leases Blackacre to T, who promises to pay a certain rent and
who then assigns his interest to A, the latter is bound personally
to pay that rent just as if he had promised to do so. This is on
90.
9L

227 Ore. 62, 361 P.2d 101 (1961).
2 A.L.P., supra note 57, § 9.30.
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the theory that the covenant "touches and concerns" the land
and therefore "runs with the land" to remote parties who are in
"privity of estate" with the original landlord. A question remains
as to what happens to the liability of the original tenant after he
assigns his interest to A. The courts hold that T is still liable
using the following explanation: There are two relationships involved when a landlord leases property to a tenant. First, there
is privity of estate, the tenurial estate relationship existing where
the owner of the present interest holds of the owner of the future
interest. When T assigns his interest to A, A is now in privity of
estate with L and is liable to L on that theory with respect to
covenants that run with the land. However, there is a second relationship created between L and T at the time of the original
transaction-a contractual one. The courts describe this as "privity of contract." Although privity of estate is terminated by T's
assignment, the privity of contract is not and T remains liable
on his contractual arrangement with L unless L expressly releases T. 9 2 (Of course, if T were forced to pay, he in turn would
have a cause of action over against A for reimbursement.) Although this result is apparently reached through a rather mechanical application of legal concepts, it is sound in policy. When
L contracted with T for T to pay rent for a certain period, L
was relying upon the credit and standing of T. It would obviously be inequitable to allow T to shift the responsibility to
another and perhaps less pecunious person for whose credit L
did not bargain. Therefore, the law imposed responsibility upon
both, but as between the two, A had to reimburse T.
Extending the analysis one step further, if A now reassigns
his interest to B the latter would be in privity of estate and liable
directly to L on that theory. A, however, in contradistinction
to T, would not be liable to L for rents accruing after his assignment because A was never in privity of contract with L and now
is no longer in privity of estate with him. 3 In the policy terms
92.

Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895); South Bay

Center, Inc. v. Butler, Herrick, & Marshall, 413 Misc. 2d 269, 250 N.Y.S.
2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Fidelity Bank v. Bloomfield, 246 N.C. 492, 98
S.E.2d 865 (1957); Carter v. Stovall, 291 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.

1956); Stuart v. Joy, 1 K.B. 362 (1904). See discussion in 2 A.L.P., supra
note 57, § 9.5 at 355.
93. Cork-Oswalt, Inc. v. Hickory Hotel Co., 20 IlM. App. 406, 156
N.E.2d 259 (1959); Cohen v. Todd, 130 Minn. 227, 153 N.W. 531 (1915);

Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Maloof, 89 N.J. Super. 128, 214 A.2d 45
(App. Div. 1965). It should be noted that if the first assignee expressly
assumed the obligations of the lease, a new privity of contract was said
to be created, and the assignee was liable for future breaches after re-
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here articulated, A should not be liable to L after he assigns his
interest to B because L did not rely on A's credit at the time he
made the lease and A is no longer benefiting from the occupancy
since it is now in the hands of B.
The problems above described are complicated by the distinction between the assignment and the sublease. The classic doctrine stated that if T subleased, rather than assigned, to A, there
would be no direct liability from A to L in the absence of an express undertaking by A to be so liable.9 4 The reason for the rule
made sense in the medieval legal context in which the doctrine
arose. Since in the case of a sublease A would be holding of T
who in turn would be holding of L, there would be no privity of
estate between L and A. Rather, there would be privity of estate between L and T and between T and A. And since there
was also no privity of contract between L and A (no direct contractual relationship), there was no theory upon which the courts
could posit liability from one to the other. Thus, the issue of remote party liability was made to depend upon whether the court
characterized the transaction as an "assignment" or as a "sublease."
The distinction most courts made and continue to make is
easy to state. If T transfers his interest for the entire remainder
of the term, it is an assignment, 95 and A is liable upon and may
enforce covenants in the main lease that run with the land. If,
on the other hand, T reserves even a day at the end of the term
when he can come back into possession, the relationship created
is one of sublease, 96 and A is not liable under and cannot enforce
the provisions of the main lease. Some courts have held, in addition, that if the instrument contained agreements different
from those in the main lease 97 or if the tenant reserved a right to
assignment. See Bornel, Inc. v. City Products Corp., 432 P.2d 489 (Wyo.
1967).
94. Haynes v. Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1961);
Indian Refining Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ind. App. 615, 181 N.E. 283 (1932);
Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So. 2d 762 (1956).
95. Gilbert v. Van Kleeck, 284 App. Div. 611, 132 N.Y.S.2d 580
(1954), motion denied, 284 App. Div. 857, 134 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1955), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 882, 126 N.E.2d 383 (1955), motion denied,
308 N.Y. 1045, 127 N.E.2d 873 (1955); State v. Meador, 60 Wash. 2d 543,
374 P.2d 546 (1962).
96. Leibowitz v. Bickford's Lunch System, 241 N.Y. 569, 150 N.E. 525
(1926); Bowlby-Harman Lumber Co. v. Commodore Services, Inc., 144
W. Va. 239,107 SXE.2d 602 (1959).
97. Lebel v. Backman, 342 Mass. 759, 175 N.E.2d 362 (1961); Morrisvile Shopping Center v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 381 Pa. 576, 112 A.2d
183 (1955).
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re-enter on the transferee's breach, these per se would render the
transfer a sublease 8
The important question, obviously, is whether the assignment/sublease dichotomy, which was based upon ancient tenurial
notions, has any reason for existence in a modem leasing system.
Suppose L leases a house to T for a five year term at a rental of
$2,400 per year and that T agrees to keep the premises in repair
as well as to replace any appliances or fixtures that may wear
out. Suppose further that T is a professor who annually goes to
another school for summer teaching and that he regularly "sublets" the house each summer to anybody he can find who needs
it for the period he is planning to be away. For the second summer of the five year term T sublets to S at a rental of $200 per
month for three months payable to T. S enters into possession
and soon thereafter the central air-conditioning, automatic dishwasher and washing machine all fail and need replacement. Before S has paid the first month's rent, T goes insolvent and L demands that S pay the rent directly to L and that he replace the
worn-out appliances in accordance with the main lease. Most
people, surely, would find unjust a rule imposing liability upon
S to replace the appliances. On the other hand, one would not
find intrinsically offensive a rule requiring S to pay the rent directly to L. However, if S had not merely taken a three month
portion of the term remaining, but instead had taken over the
entire remainder of the term, the average person might well expect the law to impose remote party liability upon S for both
land-related covenants. Thus, it appears that the assignment/
sublease distinction rests for modern purposes upon the same
policy considerations that we shall see underlie the touch and
concern issue-giving effect to community understanding. The
distinction properly applied would give effect to the normal or
usual understandings of the community with respect to the remote-party liability issue and prevent unexpected and unexpectable liability.
However, the addition of this variable into the weighing
process makes the problem a bit more complicated. In the above
example, the expectations of the community might well require
S to pay rent to L but not to replace the appliances, though both
covenants would normally be considered to "touch and concern"
and thus run with the land if it were an assignment. Thus, the
98. Coles Trading Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 187 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1951);
Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912). But see per contra
authorities collected in 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 37(2) (1968).
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question of whether S has taken over the rest of the term or a
lesser period properly bears differently upon different covenants, with respect to the issue of whether they run. The analysis suggested here is not in accord with the decided cases where
the test is an either/or proposition. If the transaction is an
assignment, then all covenants touching and concerning run,
and if it is a sublease, then none do. And in turn the question
of whether the transaction is an assignment or a sublease turns
on whether every last day of the remaining term has been set
over. This can lead to the obviously undesirable result of insulating a person from liability by reason of a one-day difference.
The approach suggested here would be to leave to the trier of
fact the issue of whether, considering the nature of the covenant
and the proportion of the time left in the lease, it would be the
normal community expectation that this obligation would run
to the remote party. So constructed the rule would make policy
sense.
IV. TOUCH AND CONCERN
Spencer's Case9 9 established that the burden of a covenant
does not run to an assignee unless it "touches and concerns" the
leased property and is not merely "collateral." Although Spencer's Case involved a landlord-tenant situation, the requirement
was extended in the United States to cases involving conveyances
in fee. It was also extended to the problem of the running of
benefits: unless the agreement touches and concerns the estate
to be benefited, the benefit does not run in the absence of an express assignment of the benefit. The main questions to be considered in this discussion are: what is meant by touch and concern; is there any formula or test which can be used to predict the
result of the application of the requirement in a novel case; does
the touch and concern test have a basis in sound policy or does it
represent the mere survival of the technical rules of an obsolete
era?

A.

TsE PoLIcy Am THE TESTS TO DETRmnmE

Before discussing exactly how the complicated rules worked
out historically, it would be well to state what policies governed
and militated toward the results actually reached. With this
background in mind, it will be easier to analyze and perhaps
criticize the presently existing structure of rules.
99. 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
note 13 supra.

See text accompanying
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The touch and concern requirement is a method of restricting
kinds of promises that may devolve to remote parties. It is as if
the law were saying, "It is not every kind of promise contained in
a lease or deed which will run with the land to assignees of the
original parties. Only those which 'touch and concern' the land
itself will run to these subsequent holders." Why should the law
take certain kinds of promises and say these shall run, while
these others shall not? Perhaps the use of an extreme example
will help to explain the underlying policies. Suppose L leases
Blackacre to T and T agrees in the written instrument to (1) pay
rent of $1,000 per year; (2) keep the premises in good repair, and
(3) buy L's horse, Dobbin, for $10,000. Suppose further, that T
assigns the lease to A, who refuses to perform any of the agreements in the lease. L now sues A to recover for breach of the
three covenants. It is apparent that there is a difference in the
nature of these undertakings. This can best be shown by thinking of the problem from A's point of view. When A studies the
lease before taking the assignment, he is likely to assume that
covenants (1) and (2) will be binding upon him because they
have to do with the tenancy relationship and the duties of T as
tenant, and he is also likely to assume that covenant (3) is not
binding upon him for the reverse reason that the promise of T
to buy L's horse bound T not as a tenant but as an individual.
That promise had nothing to do with the lease at all and could
just as well have been in a different instrument. The law says
that covenants (1) and (2) touch and concern the land and run
and that covenant (3) is collateral or personal and does not run.
Therefore, A will be liable to perform (1) and (2) but not (3).
On the other hand, if one fact were changed in the above hypothetical, the situation takes on an entirely different cast. Assume that L is leasing a racing stable to T and that as part of the
deal, L is selling Dobbin to T. In that case, A in taking the assignment might well expect that the agreement concerning Dobbin would accompany what really is in effect the purchase of a
racing stable enterprise. Thus, A should be liable on that promise
as well. The real policy, then, is to give effect to the intent that
most people would probably have if they thought about the issue
and thereby protect subsequent parties against unexpected and
unexpectable liability. 10 0 Touch and concern is a device for in100. See C. CLARK, supra note 60, at 99: "Where the parties, as laymen and not as lawyers, would naturally regard the covenant as
intimately bound up with the land, aiding the promisee as landowner or
hampering the promisor in similar capacity, the requirement [of touch

1970]

PROMISES RESPECTING THE USE OF LAND

209

tent effectuation, through which the law conforms itself to the
normal, usual or probable understandings of the community.
As in the case of every legal distinction, those undertakings
that touch and concern and those that are merely collateral tend
to shade one into the other. In the gray areas, a decided case is
a much better guide to prediction of the actual outcome of pending litigation than "intuition" or "reasoning." A few hypotheticals will be useful in illuminating the gray areas, how the courts
have dealt with them and whether perhaps there may be a
sounder way to approach them.
Assume that L, owner of Blackacre and Whiteacre, two adjoining tracts, operates a drug store on Blackacre. L leases Blackacre to T, who plans to continue the drug store under his own
management and ownership. In the lease, L agrees not to open
a drug store in competition with T within one mile of the leased
premises. L sells Whiteacre to P, who opens a drug store there,
and T assigns his lease to A. L as tenant then leases Greenacre,
property across the street, and opens a drug store. T, having assigned to A, decides to lease a nearby store on Purpleacre where
he also operates a drug store.
Let us analyze first against whom the covenant may be enforced. Stated in legal terminology, the question is whether the
burden of the covenant runs with Blackacre, Whiteacre or is
personal to L. Looking at it from what would normally be intended, clearly if it runs with any property at all, it runs with
Whiteacre. The commitment of L is to refrain from using property he controls in the described way. But is L committing
Whiteacre, whoever owns it, or himself as an individual? Arguably, T, at the time of the original lease was afraid that L, who
had an established business and goodwill, would take these with
him to an adjoining location and thereby defeat the purpose for
which T leased the property. Therefore, is not the burden of the
covenant personal to L? On the other hand, it is also arguable
and concern] should be held fulfilled."
The test discussed here also has some judicial support. In Abbott
v. Bob's U-Drive, 222 Ore. 147, 352 P.2d 598 (1960), the court said:
In applying this test we believe that it is important not only to
consider how the original parties as laymen would naturally regard the covenant, but how one taking a lease as assignee would
regard it. Assuming this to be a test to be judicially applied,
we believe that the average person accepting the assignment of
a lease containing a covenant to arbitrate questions relating
to the terms of the lease would normally assume that he was
bound by the covenant.
Id. at 160, 352 P.2d at 604. See also Hudspeth v. Eastern Ore. Land
Co., 247 Ore. 372, 430 P.2d 353 (1967).
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that T wanted to prevent the opening of a drug store on the
premises next door; would not any subsequent party who took
an assignment of the lease reasonably think that the agreement
was meant to protect the tenant of Blackacre from competition on
adjoining Whiteacre? There is one point which suggests itself
from this discussion. Why is there not a category of promises
that both touch and concern and are personal?' 01 There seems
to be no suggestion of this approach in the literature on the
subject. The reason perhaps stems from a general misapprehension of the nature of the touch and concern requirement.
Traditionally, the touch and concern requirement has been
viewed as a matter of objective determinability. One of the old
formulations of the test is found in Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, which stated that the covenant touched and concerned the
land if it "affected the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances; or if it affected
the mode of enjoying it.'1 0 2 Another traditional statement of the
test is "a covenant beneficial to the owner of the estate, and to
no one but the owner of the estate."'1 3 Both of these approaches
-the first from the point of view of the burden, and the second
from that of the benefit-are circular. The covenant will affect
the "nature of the thing demised" if we hold that the covenant
touches and concerns and therefore runs. Likewise, it will be
"beneficial to the owner of the estate" if we hold it touches and
concerns. It is foolishness to make identical the test of whether
X exists and the result of holding that it does. The famous formulation of Professor Bigelow' 0 4 has a similar difficulty. He
suggested that courts ascertain the effect upon the legal relations
101. One must be very careful in using and defining the ideas that
the burden is personal or that it touches and concerns and therefore runs.
It is true that, with respect to affirmative promises, when a burden
touches and concerns and therefore runs, the original party bound is
still bound on the engagement on a privity of contract theory, even
after he assigns to an assignee who becomes bound on a privity of estate
theory. Thus, when Tenant who has agreed to pay rent assigns to Assignee, Tenant is still bound to pay the rent if Assignee does not, even
though the burden of the covenant to pay rent touches and concerns and
concerns and runs to Assignee. In that sense the covenant to pay rent
is also personal to Tenant. The reason for the rule is that Landlord
looked to Tenant's personal credit when he leased the property to him.
However, in the restrictive covenant area the same analysis would not
hold true. There, the courts' tendency is to view it as binding either the
person or the land, but not both.
102.

103 Eng. Rep. 725, 727 (K.B. 1808).

103. Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Ald. 1, 106 Eng. Rep. 1094, 1097 (K.B.
1821).
104. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. Rsv.
639 (1914).
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of the parties and that if the promisor's legal relations with respect to the land are decreased in value then the covenant touches
and concerns that land. Conversely if the promisee's legal relations with respect to the land are increased in value, then the
benefit similarly touches and concerns that land. The infirmity
of the Bigelow test also is its circularity. 105 If we hold the
burden of the covenant touches and concerns, then the promisor's
legal relations with respect to the land will decrease in value.
But the latter is the very question we ask to determine if it does
touch and concern- Under this test we will still have the problem
of determining whether the individual's relations are increased
or decreased with respect to the land involved. And this latter
phrase seems equally as meaningless as "touch and concern the
land."
The great problem with finding a workable test for touch
and concern has been the failure of courts and writers to take
into account the policy behind the requirement. As has been
noted,'0. 6 the requirement does serve the useful purpose of putting the normal expectations of society into effect unless an actual intent to the contrary is evinced. If this is so, then the test
of touch and concern ought to be what the usual expectation of a
well-informed layman would be in this instance. And if that is
so, then it would appear that there are three forms which that
expectation could assume. First, the normal expectation could
be that the promise is bound up with an interest in the land; second, it could be that promise is personal, and third, and for the
purpose of this discussion, most importantly, it could be that most
people would assume that the promise is both personal and
bound up with an interest in land. If there are such cases--and
the last hypothetical seems to be one-then there are promises
the burden or benefit of which both are personal and follow the
land. The assumption that the covenant must either run with
the land or be personal pervades all the previous discussion of this
area and is based on an ostensibly logical but actually unsound
07
policy foundation.'
105. Such a criticism of the Bigelow test was made in Abbott v.
Bob's U-Drive, 222 Ore. 147, 352 P.2d 598 (1960). See also C. CLARK, supra
note 60, at 96-111.
106. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
107. In this area of covenants against competition, the tendency is
definitely to hold that the burden touches and concerns and therefore
runs with L's land. See, e.g., Flagg v. Andrew Williams Stores, Inc.,
127 Cal. App. 2d 165, 273 P.2d 294 (1954); Vaughan v. General Outdoor
Adv. Co., 352 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1961); Weiss v. Mayflower Doughnut
Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 310, 135 N.E.2d 208, 152 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1956). The cases
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This is not to say that in this hypothetical the burden would
always run and be personal. Rather the question would have to
be answered on a case-by-case basis depending on variables not
yet herein fully explored. For example, if L leased the drug
store to T with the idea that T was taking over L's enterprise and
good will it would certainly appear as if the covenant were extracted to protect against the possibility that L would take his
old customers with him to a new, nearby location. And as
noted above, it may also be that T is attempting to bind L's
land in the vicinity. On the other hand, if L is the owner of a
shopping center who is not in the business which is the subject
matter of the covenant, it may be that the only desire would be
to bind the other land in that center to noncompetition. In such
case, a decision that the burden is not personal but runs with the
rest of the shopping center would be fully justified. At this
point, the argument gives the illusion of having been subtly
transformed, so as to be addressing what the intentions and desires of these particular parties were rather than society's understanding of what the arrangement should be held to be. But, in
fact, the transformation has not really been made. When it is
said that T and L "intended" something, what is meant is that
we as reasonable men think they must have intended; this is
really a statement of a societal understanding.
If, as suggested here, the normal expectations of society is the
test and these depend on numerous possible variations in fact
patterns, the jury, which at least theoretically represents the
judgment and knowledge of the intelligent members of the community, would most appropriately be used to apply the standard
where reasonable men could differ as to the result. A result more
in consonance with the ideas and customs of the community perhaps would follow. Of course, this view is absolutely contrary to
the uniformly followed rule that the question of touch and concern is a "question of law" for the judge's determination.
Let us now consider the running of the benefit in connection
with the above hypothetical. May A, the assignee of the leased
property enforce it, or may T in his new location? Or again is it
possible that both may do so? When A received his assignment
of the leasehold interest from T, he would naturally assume that
the intent of the original parties would be that the right to enforce the covenant would belong to whoever was occupying
Blackacre under the lease. Therefore, A could clearly enforce
are collected in Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 76 (1964)

A.L.R.3d 897 (1969).

and in Annot., 25
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the covenant against L himself if L were the one operating the
drug store on Whiteacre.108 On the other hand, it would not appear as if T could enforce from his new location. The covenant, it
may be assumed, was agreed to by L to protect T in his use of the
premises which L was leasing. Again it would be possible to
hypothesize a situation in which this was not the case. Perhaps
T was extracting the covenant to get some long term protection
from L's competition no matter where in the vicinity T might be
located in the future. But this would be an atypical case. Where
this kind of situation existed the question might well be for the
jury. Otherwise, where there is no doubt as to normal intent,
the judge could well decide the issue.
In connection with this last hypothetical, there is yet another
problem arguably presented. Assume that the benefit runs with
the land to A but that the burden is personal to L. Is there any
reason in policy to prohibit a running benefit when the burden is
personal? It would seem not. The fact that a benefit is appurtenant to an interest in land tends to make that interest more
readily marketable, and since there is here no corresponding land
burdened, which is thereby made less marketable, there appears
to be no reason to prevent the running of such benefits.100
Another issue raised by the covenant against competition is
whether the benefit must be "physical" rather than "commercial"
before it is said that it touches and concerns and therefore can0
11
run with the land. In the famous case of Norcross v. James,
Justice Holmes was presented with the problem of whether the
benefit of a covenant not to compete ran with the land benefited.
In holding that it did not, he seemed to set down a rule that the
benefit must be a physical one-one relating to what the senses
can take in-rather than one merely enhancing its commercial
value, before it can run with the land. "In what way does [the
covenant] extend to the support of the plaintiff's quarry? It
does not make the use or occupation of it more convenient. It
does not in any way affect the use or occupation; it simply tends
indirectly to increase its value, by excluding a competitor from
This rule which purports to
the market for its products.""'
108. Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir.

1942); Schmidt-v. Hershey, 154 Md. 302, 140 A. 363 (1928). See cases
collected in Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 72 (1964).
109. National Union Bank v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1877), allows the benefit to run. The Restatement is in accord. REsTATEmENT
or PROPERTY § 543, comment e and illustration 3 (1944) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also C. CLARK, supra note 60, at 106.
110.
111.

140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
Id. at 192, 2 N.E. at 949. This same distinction between physical
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limit the situations in which the benefit may run has been followed in at least two other Massachusetts cases, the latter of the
two acknowledging that the rule probably is not relevant to a
modern economy but refusing to overrule it because of the reliance of the bar upon a rule of real property." 2 It is indeed
difficult to articulate a policy justifying a distinction between
physical and commercial enhancement, unless one relies upon
the basic approach of the Restatement that covenants in general serve to inhibit the alienation of land and are therefore undesirable. 1 3 The other argument, that the running of covenants which inhibit free competition ought to be limited, seems
fallacious. If the covenant is against the common law policy favoring competition, it ought to be invalid as between the original
parties to the transaction, and not just unenforcible by subsequent parties. There is, of course, a body of law outside the
scope of this paper that does deal with these covenants against
competition and outlaws unreasonable restraints on trade. Looking at the problem from the viewpoint of the basic test proposed
herein for touch and concern, the "normal intent" to have such
an agreement run or not run, there seems little reason to make
the distinction. As has been demonstrated herein, society's expectation may very well be to have such covenants run with the
land. There is much authority opposed to the Holmesian
4
view."
Assume now the following problem:
L owns Blackacre and Whiteacre, two adjoining parcels with
small stores on each. L runs a liquor store on Whiteacre and
and commercial enhancement is made in Price v. Anderson, 358 Pa.
209, 56 A.2d 215 (1948).

112. Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons Co., 352 Mass. 725,

227 N.E.2d 509 (1967); Shade v. M. O'Keefe, Inc., 260 Mass. 180, 156
N.E. 867 (1927).
113. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, Servitudes, pp. 3160-61. The

distinction between physical use and enjoyment and commercial enhancement with respect to the running of the burden is made in RESTATEMENT § 537, comment f and illustration 1.

114. See, e.g., National Union Bank v. Segur, 39 N.J.L. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1877). The court said, "[A] covenant touches and concerns land when

its performance confers a direct benefit on the owner of land by reason
of his ownership . . . ." Id. at 186. See also Clem v. Valentine, 155
Md. 19, 141 A. 710 (1928).

The Restatement allows the benefit of such a covenant to run but

not the burden. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 543(2) (b), comment e
and § 537, comment f.

Most cases allowing the benefit to run do not mention the distinction of Justice Holmes at all. See cases collected in 97 A.L.R.2d 4,
72-75 (1964).
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leases Blackacre to T with the covenant that T shall not use the
leased premises as a liquor store. L sells Whiteacre to P, who
plans to continue operation of the store. L then buys Greenacre,
a parcel across the street from the first two, and erects a building
and begins operating a liquor store. Subsequently, T assigns his
lease to A, who opens a liquor store on Blackacre. Then T leases
a store on Purpleacre, a tract nearby, and also opens a liquor
store. L and P sue to enjoin A's and T's operation of the premises in violation of the restrictive covenant. Who, if anyone, is
entitled to the injunction, and against whom? It may be said
at the outset that the burden of the covenant clearly touches and
concerns Blackacre in the sense that the average assignee of a
tenant would assume it was originally intended that Blackacre
could not be used for the sale of liquor whether T or someone else
was the tenant in possession. Thus, A would be bound to comply
with the covenant, assuming that we allow someone to enforce
it at all. On the other hand, it would appear that T is not bound
personally and that he could probably run the store on Purpleacre with impunity. His promise was not to use the leased premises in a certain way, and it would be a fair inference that he was
binding himself with respect to his occupancy of those premises
only. If, on the contrary, T's promise had been not to compete
as a liquor operator within a described radius of Blackacre, it
could be said to be a personal covenant as well as running with
the leased premises to bind A.
A more difficult problem here is in the analysis of the benefit end. Does the benefit touch and concern any property and,
if so, which? The answer is not perfectly clear. First, it may be
said that if the benefit touches and concerns any property at all,
it must be Whiteacre and not Blackacre. That is, the agreement
that T shall not use Blackacre for a liquor store was not meant to
benefit L in his ownership of Blackacre but rather in his ownership of Whiteacre, where the liquor store was located at the time
of the making of the lease. If such a view were accepted, then
only P, the present owner of Whiteacre, could enforce the covenant. On the other hand, it could be argued that the agreement
was extracted from T not for the benefit of L's operation on
Whiteacre but rather for the benefit of L as a liquor store operator who had a clientele in the neighborhood and that even after
L sold Whiteacre he could enforce the covenant if he had an interest in so doing. If that view were accepted, then L alone
could enforce the agreement, assuming there were no other impediments to enforcement, a matter we will presently consider.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:167

Which one of these alternative views is more sound? Was the
covenant more likely extracted for the benefit of the owner of
Whiteacre, whoever he might be, or was it meant to benefit L
personally, wherever in the neighborhood he might operate such
a store? Or is the third alternative, that the benefit both is
personal and runs wth the land, the most likely? The correct
solution is again to leave the question in the ambiguous cases to a
representative cross section of the community, the jury. In this
particular hypothetical it seems that the circumstances admit
one interpretation just as easily as the other. It should also be
noted that the case of the ambiguous running benefit does not
present as severe a problem as the ambiguous burden. In the
former case the question is really who can enforce a right conceded to exist in someone. In the latter case the question is
whether there is a burden on a particular person at all.
One other difficulty is presented by the above case. Assume
we take the view that the benefit is personal to L and that only
he can enforce it and further that the burden touches and concerns Blackacre. An argument can be made that, as a general
policy, the burden of these covenants in gross should not run
into the hands of a purchaser of the burdened property because
unless the burden represents some corresponding benefit in the
use of some land it will inhibit land use, development and alienation." 5 In answer, however, the words of Judge Clark seem
appropriate: "In view of the general social policy which very
clearly upholds restrictions on use of property, it would seem
proper that such agreements should be enforced without regard
to the accident of the plaintiff's ownership of property in the
vicinity."" 6 The point often overlooked by the other side is
that promises respecting the use of land also have great utility in
promoting the ready transfer of land. Thus, for example, a promise to pay an annual assessment for the maintenance of common
areas, though a burden on the land, also helps to increase its
value with the utility of the common areas.

B. TOUCH AND CONCERN IN EQuiTY
It was stated earlier that the privity of estate requirement
applied at law for a covenant to run was not applied in the courts
of equity. 117 A related question is whether the touch and con115.
116.

RESTATEMENT, supra

C.

note 109, § 537, comment c.

CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WIT

LAND" 110 (2d ed. 1947).

117. See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
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cern requirement was similarly relaxed in equity. The answer is
quite complex. In the statement of the rule first creating equitable servitudes in Tulk v. Moxhay the court said: "[T]he question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether
a party shall be permitted to use the land in the manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with
notice of which he purchased." And later the court said, "[I]f
an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased."'1 s The emphasized words in the above clearly indicate the court's underlying
(and perhaps unconscious) assumption that the covenant must
be land-related or "touch and concern" the land before a subsequent purchaser would be bound not to disobey it.
Almost every case that has come down on the equity side
has, like Tulk, involved negative covenants-promises with respect to how land shall not be used. Such promises clearly do
touch and concern the land involved and so the courts of equity,
for the most part, have not stated nor found it necessary to state
touch and concern as a separate requirement. There are, however, some cases that have expressly dealt with the issue, mostly
in the area of covenants against competition. Typical is the
famous opinion of Justice Holmes in Norcross v. James. In
that case, grantor conveyed to grantee premises which the latter
planned to use as a quarry, the grantor covenanting not to use
retained premises for that purpose. Plaintiff, successor of the
grantee, sued defendant, successor of the grantor, to enjoin
quarrying in violation of the covenant. Justice Holmes said:
"The principle of policy applied to affirmative covenants applies
also to negative ones. They must 'touch or concern,' or 'extend
to the support of the thing' conveyed." The court held that the
defendant could not be enjoined.
In what way does [the covenant] extend to the support of the
plaintiff's quarry? It does not make the use or occupation of it
more convenient. It does not in any way affect the use or occupation; it simply tends indirectly to increase its value, 0by excluding a competitor from the market for its products."
118. Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848) (emphasis
added).
119. 140 Mass. 188, 192, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (1885). See also Kettle
River Ry. v. Eastern Ry., 41 Minn. 461, 43 N.W. 469 (1889). In the
latter case the court said, "In other words, equity follows the law in
that it will not enforce a covenant as against the heir or assignee unless
the obligation it imposes is one which attaches to or concerns the land
or its use or mode of enjoyment." Id. at 475, 43 N.W. at 475.
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It is apparent that Justice Holmes was applying the touch
and concern test on the equity side. But there the clarity ends.
It is impossible to tell from the opinion whether he was saying
that the burden does not "touch and concern" grantor's land, or
the benefit does not touch and concern grantee's land or both.
He seemed, as mentioned in the preceding section, to set down as
a requisite of touch and concern that the benefit be a physical
one-one relating to what the senses can take in-rather than one
merely enhancing its commercial value.
It seems perfectly clear that there is as much reason to apply
the idea of touch and concern in equitable enforcement of promises as there is in legal. To take an extreme example, assume
that L is owner of Blackacre and by occupation is a theatrical
booking agent. Assume further that T is an actor who is desirous of leasing Blackacre and that L leases Blackacre to T for
an agreed rental. In the lease T covenants for himself and his
heirs and assigns that he will use L as his exclusive agent for
negotiation of contracts for his acting talents and that he will not
accept an acting contract unless L is acting as agent. Assume
that T assigns the lease to A, another actor. A should not be
bound to use L as his agent, nor should he be enjoined in equity
from entering into contracts without using L. The same reason
for the rule applies here as in the problem of legal enforcement.
The court is giving effect to the normal expectations of the community.
On the other hand, it is not only when the agreement is said to
touch and concern the land that the burden may run to remote
parties. There are cases where the community might expect the
burden to run even though it has no connection with the promisor
in his capacity as owner of an interest in land. The case of Pratte
v. Balatsos120 is apposite. There, plaintiff entered into an agreement with one Larochelle that plaintiff would install a coin
operated record player in Larochelle's restaurant business for
142 years with 40 percent of the proceeds going to the latter.
Further it was agreed that "no similar equipment . . . will be installed or operated on [the] premises by anyone else." Larochelle, whose restaurant was occupied under a lease, sold his
business to defendant and as part of the transaction assigned the
lease to him. Defendant did not accept an assignment of the
plaintiff's contract, nor did he expressly agree to perform it; but
he admitted that he had notice of the contract when he took the
120. 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955).
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lease assignment. He also claimed, however, that he did not
know that he was entitled to only 40 percent of the proceeds until
after he closed the deal. Defendant notified plaintiff to remove
the machine and plaintiff sued in equity to enjoin defendant
from breaching.
Defendant contended inter alia that the covenant in question
could not be enforced against him because it did not touch and
concern or run with the land. Plaintiff contended on the other
hand that it ran instead with the business and was therefore
binding upon defendant. The court quoted with approval a
statement by Pomeroy that a covenant can be enforced in equity
by means of injunction "even when the covenants are not of the
kind which technically run with the land." It held that if the defendant had such notice as to put him on inquiry of the terms of
the contract he would be bound by it. The decision should not
be read as dispensing completely with the touch and concern requirement. Rather, it rests (perhaps unconsciously) upon the
policy underlying touch and concern, the effectuation of the
normal understandings of the community. It is not only landrelated agreements that the community might assume would run.
It might also assume that the burden of a business-related agreement would run to the purchaser of the business. Thus, there is
just as much reason to burden the subsequent party here as in
the land-related case. This subject of equitable servitudes in
non-land situations has received substantial treatment else12 1
where.

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETwEEN INTENTION AND ToucH
NCOCCERN
It should be apparent from what has already been said that
the requirements of Spencer's Case of intention and touch and
concern have a very close relationship to each other. The intention requirement relates to the actual state of mind of the original parties to the transaction on the issue of whether they wanted
this particular benefit or burden to run with ownership. The
touch and concern requirement, on the other hand, pertains to
what the normal expectations of society would be as to whether
this particular benefit or burden so relates to the owner in his
capacity as owner that the average person would assume that the
law would decree that such benefit or burden would accompany
121. Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1956); Chafee, Equitable

Servitudes on Chattels,41 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1928).
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the ownership. In other words, the distinction is between the intentions of the immediate parties and the intentions and understandings of society in general. Quite often the intention of the
original parties to the transaction is not stated at all or, if stated,
is not clear. It would seem that when the courts in the face of
this difficulty purport to deal with the intent of these parties,
they are really dealing with their ideas of what most parties
would expect or intend. They are thus unwittingly applying
the same test twice to the issue, as this is the same inquiry that
to determine whether the
they apply (sometimes unconsciously)
122
covenant touches and concerns.

D. THE DECIDED CASES AND THE THEORIES CONTRASTED
It will now be profitable to look at the decided cases to see
whether they accord in a rough way with the policy considerations outlined. It is convenient to divide the cases into three
categories, those involving covenants (1) to do or not to do a
physical act on the premises; (2) to pay money, and (3) respecting
the duration of a leasehold.
2
1. Physical Acts on the Premises' 3

The normal expectation of parties to a lease would be that
covenants by either party promising the commission or noncommission of a physical act upon the premises are within that
party's capacity as landlord or tenant and binding upon and enforceable by the successors to the original parties. The cases
generally are in accord, holding these promises to touch and concern. Thus, the burden of the tenant's agreement to keep the
property in good repair 124 or to vacate upon sale of the premises 25 would touch and concern and run to an assignee of the
122. A perfect example of this type of duplication is the case of

Hudspeth v. Eastern Ore. Land Co., 247 Ore. 372, 430 P.2d 353 (1967)
where the court said, "The intention of the original parties may
be derived from the language used in the instrument or from the fact
that the undertaking is one which because of business practice, custom,
or the common understanding of the community is deemed to have
been intended to benefit those who succeed to the promisee's land."
Id. at 379, 430 P.2d at 357.
123. For a detailed review of the authorities see Annot., 41 A.L.R.
1363 (1926); Annot., 102 A.L.R. 781 (1936); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 982
(1939) and Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1959), all dealing with affirmative covenants running with the land.
124. Herboth v. American Radiator Co., 145 Mo. App. 484, 123 S.W.
533 (1909); Magoon v. Eastman, 86 Vt. 261, 84 A. 869 (1912).
125. Hirschberg v. Russell, 317 Ill. App. 329, 45 N.E.2d 886 (1943);
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tenant and the benefit would run to the successor of the landlord's reversion. Likewise, the burden of the landlord's undertaking to heat the leased building, 12 0 to supply water 2 - or to
repair 128 would run to the grantee of the landlord and the
benefit to the tenant's assignee.
A similar approach is used with respect to promises to perform physical acts contained in conveyances in fee. For example,
if the promise requires construction or maintenance of a structure on the premises, the burden of the covenant would run with
the land in the hands of a subsequent grantee and the benefit
would run with the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited. 129 And where the agreement is to furnish water, gas or
electricity, the cases turn on whether the services are supplied
from the land of the burdened party and are to be used on the
property of the benefited party. If they are, then both the
benefit and burden run with the appropriate property. 13 0 If, on
the other hand, the service is not supplied from the adjoining
land, the burden would not run, and likewise if the service is not
to be used on the property of the benefited party, the benefit
would not run. Thus, if a grantee as part of the consideration
for the purchase of land agrees to supply his grantor with electric power if a certain mill on the conveyed property is moved,
the burden would not run with the conveyed property, as it
was not contemplated that the power would be manufactured
on the property.' 3 ' This would seem to accord with normal
expectations in that situation.
Promises not to perform a physical act involve most intimately
the equity jurisdiction of the court. The courts of equity have
In re Loew's Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 233 N.Y. 495, 135 N.E. 862 (1922).
Both cases held the benefit of the covenant runs with the land to the

grantee of the reversion. However, the latter case involved an agreement reserving the right to terminate for only a period of three months
after the original lessor sold the premises.
126. Storandt v. Vogel & Binder Co., 140 App. Div. 671, 125 N.Y.S.
568 (1910).

127. Jourdain v. Wilson, 106 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1821).
128. Morehouse v. Woodruff, 218 N.Y. 494, 113 N.E. 512 (1916);
Hight v. McCulloch, 150 Tenn. 117, 263 S.W. 794 (1924).
129. New York Cent. & I. R. R.I. v. Clarke, 228 Mass. 874, 117
N.E. 322 (1917) (construction and maintenance of a fence); Mueller v.
Bankers' Trust Co., 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933) (construction of a
bridge); Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 148, 279 P. 546 (1929) (maintenance
of a drainage ditch).
130. See cases collected in 2 AwracAN LAW OF PROPEnrY § 9.13 nn.
32-33 (Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as A.L.P.].
131. Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 181
S.E. 66 (1935).
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generally not discussed or even mentioned the touch and concern requirement with respect to the equitable servitude. The
reason for this is clear. The usual promise enforced there involves an engagement not to build industrial or commercial
structures or some similar promise with respect to how the land
is not to be used. Such a promise obviously touches and concerns or, in the policy terms here articulated, normally would be
intended to bind successors. Therefore, as noted above, courts
of equity, which deal almost exclusively with these negative
agreements, have not often found it necessary to mention the
touch and concern problem.
2. Promises to Pay Money
a. The Basic Problems
There is more difficulty in determining whether promises
to pay money touch and concern the land for the obvious reason
that such promises are equivocal, in that they may relate to a
transaction not necessarily having to do with a land relationship.
The test again should be whether the promise was so land-related that subsequent parties would assume that in the usual or
normal case the benefit or burden was intended to run with the
property interest. The cases do not use this approach as such;
rather they purport to approach the problem from the objective
standpoints discussed above. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
many of the easier cases reach substantially the same result as
would be reached by use of the standard suggested here. Thus,
under the authorities the burden of a covenant to pay rent runs
with the land to the assignee of the tenant and the benefit runs
13 2
to the successor in ownership of the landlord's reversion.
This result accords with what the usual intent of the parties
would be, where it would be expected that the successor of the
tenant would have the obligation to pay rent and the new property owner the right to enforce that obligation. The same rule
would obtain with respect to the tenant's covenant to pay the
1 33
taxes on the leased premises.
132. Weber v. C & C Dry Goods Co., 253 Ky. 439, 69 S.W.2d 731
(1934); Amco Trust, Inc. v. Naylor, 311 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958); Seattle Lodge No. 211, Loyal Order of Moose v. Par-T-Pak Beverage Co., 55 Wash. 2d 587, 349 P.2d 229 (1960).
133. Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 223, 5 P. 104 (1884); Berg v. Ridgway, 258 Iowa 640, 140 N.W.2d 95 (1966); Whitney v. Leighton, 225
Minn. 1, 30 N.W.2d 329 (1948).
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b. The Problems of Greater Difficulty
There are a number of covenants to pay money which for
one reason or another have presented substantial difficulty to
courts and commentators. Sometimes the reason is the inherent
ambiguity of the underlying transaction; other times, the reason
is one of history or mistaken precedent. The areas discussed here
include tenants' covenants to pay for insuring leased property,
tenants' covenants to pay taxes on adjoining property, grantees'
agreements to pay for future assessments on adjoining property
retained by the grantor, grantees' agreements to assume mortgages on the conveyed property, grantees' agreements to pay
future assessments for the maintenance of common areas and
grantees' agreements to pay grantors' obligations with relation
to improvements existing on the conveyed premises.
i. Tenants' Covenants to Insure Leased Property
An interesting problem arises in connection with a tenant's
covenant to pay for insuring the leased property. Does the
burden run to the assignee of the tenant and can a new landlord enforce it? The cases 134 distinguish between two situations: first, where the landlord has a duty to use the proceeds of
the insurance to rebuild the property, in which case it is said that
the benefit and burden run and second, where the landlord can
pocket the proceeds, in which case it is said that neither benefit
nor burden run. The decisions have the virtues of certainty and
predictability but they seem unsound. In both cases, the usual
commercial understanding would probably be that the agreement
to pay for insurance was an additional item of rent, the burden
13 5
and benefit of which would run with the land.
iL Covenants to Pay Taxes on Adjoining Property
Assume the case of T's (tenant's) covenant in the lease to pay
134. Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 76 F. 34 (7th Cir. 1896); Masury
v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1859); Voight v. Southern Ohio Say.
Bank & Trust Co., 63 Ohio App. 56, 25 N.E.2d 304 (1939); Burton v.
Chesapeake Box &Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 57 S.E.2d 904 (1950).
135. See St. Regis Restaurants, Inc. v. Powers, 219 App. Div. 321, 219
N.Y.S. 684 (1927). This case involved insurance premiums that were to
be paid by the lessee as additional rent. The court held that since the
premiums were to be paid as part of the rent, the covenant to insure
ran to the assigns of the lessee, even though there was no provision that
the insurance proceeds would be used to rebuild the premises. It
would seem this result should follow whether the parties said it was
part of the rent or not since that is the substantial effect in any case.
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taxes on property owned by L, the landlord, adjoining the leased
premises. Assume further that L sells the leased premises to
X and the adjoining property to Y and that T assigns his lease to
A. May L, X or Y recover the amount represented by the taxes?
And against whom, T or A? There is very little authority
upon the point. The English case of Gower v. The Postmaster
1 6
General"
involved only the problem of the running of the
burden and held, citing Spencer's Case, that the burden was collateral and did not run with the leased land.
The solution to the problem should, if possible, rest upon
principles already discussed. Since the courts use the touch and
concern requirement to give effect to the normal or usual expectations of the community (at least in the absence of an expressed
intent to the contrary), it becomes crucial to determine just what
those expectations are. And here lies the most difficult problem
in this case, because the underlying obligation to pay taxes on
another piece of property is rather unusual and atypical. The
touch and concern test as above formulated obviously has its
greatest utility when the transaction is sufficiently common that
it is possible to draw meaningful and accurate conclusions about
probable community sentiment. Where the obligation is highly
unusual, it is fair to say that the community understanding about
the issue may not exist at all. If that is true in this hypothetical,
then the use of the touch and concern test may become a sterile
exercise rather than a meaningful approach. Perhaps a deeper
analysis of the economic realities will be of some help in determining a rational answer. If the amount that T originally agreed
to pay was $1,000 per month for five years plus payment of taxes
on the property next door, he must have made that agreement
because he thought the possession of the leased property was
worth that amount. In that sense then, T's agreement to pay
those taxes would normally be considered as rental for the property leased and the burden of his agreement should run to
the successor of his tenancy interest. If that is true, then
A should be liable to pay the taxes and the Gower case is wrong.
But to whom shall the taxes be paid? Again let us look at the
economics. When L leased the property to T, he, as a rational
man, would normally be expected to demand as rental for the
leased property a sum close to its value in that use. He is taking
that sum in return for allowing T to use the property. When he
takes it, he would not normally differentiate between his interest
as owner of the property leased and as owner of the adjoining
136.

57 L.T.R. (n.s.) 527 (Ch. Div. 1887).
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property. But when L sold the leased property to X and the
right to the rents passed to him, X would normally expect that
whatever rents in whatever form extracted from the leased
property would also pass to him. To take an extreme example,
suppose that the only rent payable for Blackacre were to pay the
taxes on Whiteacre. A purchaser of Blackacre in buying that
piece would assume that that amount should be payable to him.
Else he would be buying property subject to lease with no rent
being paid to him at all. Therefore, unless X had received an
adjustment in the purchase price based on this loss of rent, it
should be held that the benefit runs with the leased land to X.
But that answer poses its own problems. Could not A discharge
his obligation under the lease by paying the taxes? And would
this not benefit Y rather than X? The answer to this may be
found in the analogous area of assignments of choses in action.
Suffice it to say here that there are devices to protect persons
who in good faith pay funds to an individual who was once but
137
is no longer entitled to payment.
If, on the other hand, the agreement of T were not related
to a rental the rule might be entirely different. For example, if
T agreed to pay a rent of $1,000 per month and in addition to pay
the taxes on the property next door in order to pay off a pre-existing debt to L, the case would be entirely different. In such a situation, the agreement would be the personal responsibility of T
to L and neither the benefit nor the burden would run with the
land.
The approach suggested here does have support in a case with
very closely related facts, Child v. C. H. Winans Co.13 8 In that
case, the grantor conveyed property to the grantee for a money
consideration plus the grantee's agreement (contained in a covenant in the deed) to take a lease upon and pay the taxes on
grantor's adjoining property for the life of the grantor and her
daughter. The only reason the grantee agreed to do this was
that the grantor insisted upon it before she would agree to sell
the property the grantee very much wanted. Although under
the law of New Jersey the burden could not run with the conveyed land, since New Jersey followed the English view requiring tenurial privity, the court did the next best thing and imposed an equitable lien on the conveyed premises, which it held
137. Payment in good faith without notice would under normal
principles be a defense to a claim for a second payment. RESTATEiuEm, supra note 109, § 170 (2).
138. 119 N.J. Eq. 556, 183 A. 300 (Ct. Err. &App. 1936).
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was good against a subsequent mortgagee with notice. In doing
so the court emphasized that part of the consideration the grantee
paid for the property asserted to be burdened was the payment
of taxes on the adjoining property:
The proofs clearly establish that the rental value of the
leased [adjoining] tract was much less than half of the annual
taxes; and they further clearly establish, as has already been
pointed out, that the agreement by Lambert to pay these taxes
on the Child tract was a part of the consideration insisted upon
Child for her execution of the deed to the Lambert
by Mrs.
tract.139
Since the consideration agreed to be paid for the burdened property was to pay taxes on other property, it would be clearly unfair if someone were to come into the former piece completely
free of a duty to pay the full consideration originally agreed
upon.

iii. Grantees' Covenants to Pay for Future Assessments on
Adjoining Property Retained by Grantor

A problem closely related to the one just discussed involves a
grantee's agreement to pay for future assessments on adjoining

property retained by his grantor. The analysis should be the
same.

The problem is best discussed in connection with a de-

cided case.

In Maher v. Cleveland Union Stockyards Co.,'10

M, plaintiff's predecessor in title, conveyed to the X Stockyards

Co., defendant's predecessor in title, a strip of land so that X
could have access to a road to be built later. The consideration
for the deed was $2.00. In addition the deed provided that "[a] s
a part of the consideration of this deed, said grantee agrees to

protect and save harmless said grantor from all assessments for
the opening of Storer avenue.

. .

as to said grantor's adjoining or

abutting property." Later M conveyed the adjoining retained
piece to his daughter, the plaintiff, without mentioning the above
covenant and X conveyed all its property including the strip in
question to the defendant. The street was subsequently opened
and plaintiff brought this suit after being assessed and making a
demand for payment from defendant. The court held that the

benefit of the covenant ran with the adjoining retained piece and
the burden ran with the conveyed piece. The justification was
that the agreement to hold the grantor harmless from assessment
liability as to the retained piece was the real consideration to him
139.
140.

Id. at 561-62, 183 A. at 303.
55 Ohio App. 412, 9 N.E.2d 995 (1936).

1970]

PROMISES RESPECTING THE USE OF LAND

227

for conveying the other piece to the grantee and defendant knew
it:
If an analyzation of the host of reported cases were to be
attempted we should quickly find ourselves enmeshed in a
prolixity of legal reasoning and conflicting theories as applied in the various jurisdictions. We perceive a point of difference in the cause before us which we are unable to find considered in any reported case. That distinction lies in the fact
that the covenant or condition contained in the Maher deed to
the Farmers' & Drovers' Company is, in fact, a postponement
of the payment of the actual considerationfor the premises conveyed. It is evident that the sum of $2 was but the nominal and
not the actual consideration agreed upon. The covenantee and
the covenantor well knew that when and if Storer avenue was
produced the cost thereof would be considerable and that the
residue of the two acre tract would then be an abutting property to the street improvement and subject to assessment for
the cost thereof. It was the present lack of benefit of Maher's
land, and the future probability of a heavy charge, and the immediate and future benefit to the Farmers' & Drovers' Company's business activity that actuated the parties in postponing
payment of the actual consideration for the transfer which could
not then be estimated. It therefore appears to this court that the
Farmers' & Drovers' Company secured but the bare legal title to
the 30-foot strip, and that the equities therein retained by Maher
would only be divested upon the payment of the actual consideration yet to be paid. The Farmers' & Drovers' Company accepted this deed as written. It obligated itself to pay that
consideration when, if and in the amount subsequently ascertainable...
The question now comes: Did the appellant assume this obligation? It most certainly did, even if the word "assigns" was
omitted and it did not expressly assume its payment in the deed
to it. When it accepted Drovers' deed, containing the clause,
"and being the same land and subject to the same conditions
contained in the deed from Michael Maher to The Farmers' &
Drovers' Stockyards Company," it not only had constructive
notice, but had actual notice of the fact that the actual consideration for the 30-foot strip had not been paid. The earlier deed
was of record. It must have been known that only the nominal
consideration had been paid and that it acquired but a bare legal
title. It certainly and clearly appears to this court that it would
be most unequitable to permit these two companies to enjoy for
forty years the benefit of their purchase, and to sell the strip to
the city for a valuable consideration, and then be heard to say
that they were not bound to pay the actual purchase price of
that which they enjoyed and sold, to wit, pay the consideration,
which was the assessment levied against the two acre tract. 141
The court's analysis seems to this writer to be sensible and rational.

141.

Id. at 416-19, 9 N.E.2d at 997-98 (emphasis added).
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iv. Covenants to Pay or Assume Mortgages
The problem probably most burdened with an unfortunate
history is that of a covenant to pay or assume a mortgage. The
rule of the law has been well established that a covenant to pay
or assume a mortgage by the mortgagor or his assignee does not
run with the land to a subsequent grantee who does not expressly
assume the mortgage. 1 42 For example, if R gives a mortgage
to E, then sells the mortgaged property to A who expressly assumes payment thereof and then A sells the property to B, who
does not expressly agree to assume, B is not personally liable on
the mortgage because it is said the covenant of assumption does
not touch and concern the land and therefore the burden does
not run. In the words of the Supreme Court of Minnesota:
The agreement to assume and pay a mortgage manifestly
is not such a covenant [as to run with the land]. It is the personal agreement of the grantee to pay money due to a third
person for which the grantor is bound, and the legal effect of
The
which is to create the relation of principal and surety ....
contract does not relate to or in any manner concern the land
conveyed, or its use and enjoyment .... 148
One might reasonably ask if it is so clear that the burden of a
covenant to pay rent runs to the assignee of a leasehold interest,
why is it likewise so clear that the burden of a covenant of mortgage assumption does not run to assumer's grantee. Is the court's
justification that such a covenant "does not relate to or in any
manner concern the land conveyed or its use or enjoyment"
really true of an agreement to pay the mortgage? And is it any
more true of such an agreement than of one to pay rent? Do
not both in fact relate to the right of those in possession to remain
in possession and thereby continue "use or enjoyment?" In
fact the covenant to pay rent is even less involved with use and
enjoyment because at common law the tenant's failure to pay
The
rent did not authorize the re-entry by the landlord.
tenant could continue to default in his rent and stay in possession
in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, his liability
being, of course, to pay the rent upon suit by the landlord.
The explanation of the difference in treatment undoubtedly
lies in history. Since a covenant of assumption of a mortgage invariably involved owners in fee rather than landlord-tenant relationships, the question of whether such a covenant touched
142. Seventeenth & Locust Streets Corp. v. Montcalm Corp., 54 F.2d
42 (3d Cir. 1931); Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 117 N.W. 491 (1908);
G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 703 (1951).
143. Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 270, 117 N.W. 491, 492
(1908).
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and concerned and therefore ran with the land never came up.
This was because of the English view that affirmative covenants
could not run with the land between owners in fee for lack of
the requisite tenurial privity. The English rule was softened by
the doctrine that the grantee of mortgaged property had an obligation to indemnify his grantor against the latter's liability to
the-mortgagee for the amount of the mortgage even though there
was no express"assumption of liability to do so.' 4 4

In this coun-

try that approach has not been generally adopted. The rule in
most states seems to combine the strictest of possible approaches.
Thus, neither the burden of mortgagor's original promise to pay
nor that of any subsequent purchaser's covenant of assumption
runs with the land. And most courts do not imply an agreement
of assumption when the grantee takes "subject to" the mortgage.1 45 Thus, the grantee is not liable to the mortgagee.
Further, the courts generally refuse to imply, as the English do,
an agreement of indemnity by the grantee to his grantor.1 "
The result in the majority of jurisdictions is that the nonassuming grantee is not personally liable at all. Of course, he is under
the obvious compulsion that, unless he pays the mortgage as
due, the land will be foreclosed out from under him, but still
the mortgagor and not he will be liable for any deficiency. The
rule seems unjust. The grantee has paid to the grantor the
amount of the contract price less the amount of the unpaid mortgage. It would seem that there is an implicit understanding that
he will pay the rest of the purchase price as requested by the
mortgage. If considered anew, the problem would probably be
treated just like the burden to pay rent, which runs with the
land. But the problem is not new. Perhaps now, community
expectations are based upon the rule as it is, and a prospective
change by statute is the appropriate way to handle the problem.
v. Grantees' Agreements to Pay for Future Maintenance of
Common Areas
Covenants to pay for improvements or maintenance present
some difficult and interesting problems. Often such covenants
arise in connection with a subdivision development where the
§ 134 (3d ed. 1942).
§ 257 (1951). There are a minority of

144. J.FALcONBRIDGE, MORTGAGES

145. G.

OSBORNE, MORTGAGES

jurisdictions which imply a personal obligation to indemnify the original mortgagor or to -pay the mortgagee where the amount of the mortgage has been deducted from the purchase price paid by the last purchaser. This of course occurs in the vast majority of cases.
1 146. Id.
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developer or the property owners' association is given the responsibility of maintaining common walkways, parks, swimming
pools and other recreational facilities. In the deed to the original homeowner, there is usually a covenant in which the grantee
agrees for himself, his heirs and assigns to pay an annual assessment either to be fixed later or in a set amount to support the
maintenance. There are also many cases involving a covenant
by the grantee to pay a pro rata amount of the future construction costs of such improvements as streets, sewers and water
lines. As a matter of policy it seems to be perfectly clear that in
both types of situations the burden of the covenant ought to run
to the subsequent grantees of the original covenantor. Such an
expense would clearly relate to the individual as owner and any
reasonable purchaser would realize that. The cases are generally
in accord, 147 but there is at least limited authority that such a
covenant will not run where it leaves to the original grantor
discretion as to what maintenance services should be rendered
and, within limits, what charge should be made. 148 Where it is
clear that the developer has no responsibility to do anything and
can still make an assessment, such a result would seem to accord
with justice, but perhaps a sounder way to approach such a problem would be to imply an obligation to perform the maintenance
on the common areas and allow the covenant to run, especially in
the case where the services are in fact being rendered. In one
case, 14 9 the services were actually being rendered and still the
court said that since there was no express obligation to do so the
burden to pay for them did not run. That case seems unfortunate.
Where, because of the strict rules of local law regarding
privity, the court is impelled by precedent to hold that the
burden of an affirmative covenant to pay for future maintenance
does not run to a subsequent grantee, there is a line of cases implying a lien upon the burdened land in equity.1 50 The result is
147. Burton-Jones Development, Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich. 122, 117
N.W.2d 110 (1962); Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichton, 218 App.
Div. 374, 218 N.Y.S. 278 (1926); Harrison-Rye Realty Corp. v. New
Rochelle Trust Co., 177 Misc. 776, 31 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Ste-

phens Co. v. Lisk, 240 N.C. 289, 82 S.E.2d 99 (1954); Hughes v. Cincin-

nati, 175 Ohio St. 381, 195 N.E.2d 552 (1964).
148. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp. v. Crigler, 61 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup.

Ct. 1940).
149. Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
150.

Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 22 P. 53

(1889); Everett Factories & Terminal Corp. v. Oldetyme Distillers
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ordinarily the same because if the new owner wants to sell the
property-he will have to discharge the lien in order to convey a
marketable title, and even if he does not want to sell, the lien
may be foreclosed in equity. It would seem that the use of such
a device is salutary in that it makes viable the very important and
socially useful institution of group maintenance of common areas
in those states where, because of local peculiarities of the law regarding privity of estate, this would otherwise not be so. In opposition it could be argued, however, that the imposition of a lien by
a court clouds titles in an unforeseen and unforeseeable manner
and is therefore a burden on the recording system. The best
answer to this is that the promise to pay is itself discoverable
from the record and the lien should cause no undue surprise to
one having read the title.
vi. Grantees' Agreements to Pay Grantor's Obligations for
Existing Improvements
A difficult problem is posed by the following set of facts:
A, owner of Blackacre, contracts to have new roofing and siding
put on the residence located thereon and agrees to pay for it in
annual amounts of $500 for five years. Soon thereafter, A sells
Blackacre to B for $20,000 plus B's agreement to assume payment
of the obligation to the roofer. In the deed to B, there is a
covenant by B, his heirs and assigns to make such payment. Now
B sells Blackacre to C and there is no agreement or mention of
the duty to pay for the roofing and siding, but, of course, a
search of the record discloses to C and his attorney the existence
of the aforementioned covenant. Is C personally liable to pay
for the improvement upon land that he now owns? There is
surprisingly little authority upon the point. The American Law
of Property takes the position that if the promise is for an existing improvement and not for future maintenance, the burden
does not run with the land and is a personal debt of the covenantor. 51 This result seems subject to doubt. One seeing a
covenant to pay for such existing improvements on the back title
probably ought reasonably to assume that the covenant bound
the covenantor as owner of the land, and the burden probably
Corp., 300 Mass. 499, 15 N.E.2d 829 (1938); Whittenton Mfg. Co. v.
Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895)' Child v. C.L Winans Co.,
119 N.J. Eq. 556, 183 A. 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); University Gardens
Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Steinberg, 40 Misc. 2d 816, 244 N.Y.S.2d
208 (Dist. Ct. 1963).
151. 2 A.L.P., supra note 130, § 9.13 n.50.
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ought to run. Where it is clear that there has been a deduction
from the amount of the purchase price in the transaction to the
last grantee to cover the cost of this liability, such a result would,
of course, be much easier to justify. But where there is ambiguity on this point the case is a more doubtful one. The one
case I have found on the subject indicates that the covenant
would not run. 15 2 It would seem that in such a case the most appropriate solution would be a compromise. There is a logical
middle ground between a holding that the covenant is personal
and does not run and a holding that the burden runs with the
land. In such a situation as this, where it appears that the purchaser, argued to be personally burdened, did not receive an adjustment in the purchase price to cover his personal liability and
the covenant is such that reasonable men might differ on the
question of whether it touches and concerns the land but it is
held that it does so touch, the imposition of an equitable lien
binding the land but not the purchaser personally might be an
appropriate solution to the problem. There is, as noted above, ' "
some authority implying an equitable and foreclosable lien where
the covenant touches and concerns the land, the purchaser has
actual or constructive notice of that covenant and for some reason or other (usually lack of privity) the covenant will not run.
The extension of the lien idea to situations where there has been
no adjustment of the later purchase price would be an improvement over existing law.
c. Summary and Synthesis
The test of whether the burden of a covenant to pay money
ought to run with the land should relate to the economic realities of the situation. Where, in a landlord-tenant situation, it is
clear that the tenant's promise to pay is in essence a part of the
rent, the burden ought to run to his assignee. In the analogous
situation involving a conveyance in fee simple the problems are
much more complicated for the reason that the grantee is not
taking his grantor's identical interest in the same sense as does
the assignee of a tenant. Thus, where it is clear that the original
grantee-covenantor's promise to pay was a part of the consideration he agreed to pay to get the property he desired, that would
not necessarily end the inquiry, for the next logical question
would be whether the covenantor's successor also adjusted his
purchase price to reflect the additional burden he was assuming.
152. Pelser v. Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 8 N.W.2d 36 (1943).
153. See cases cited in note 150 supra.
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If he did, then there is a good argument that he ought to be
deemed in law to have assumed the burden to pay the obliga-

tion personally.

If he did not, then there is a plausible argu-

ment that there ought to be no personal liability unless the covenant to pay so clearly relates to the land that a purchaser could
have no reasonable doubt that he would have to pay it. In the
case where the subsequent purchaser did not adjust his purchase
price in the reasonable but mistaken belief that the obligation to
pay was personal to his grantor, the imposition of a lien upon the
land should be enough to protect the covenantee or his successor
in the great bulk of the cases. In addition, if it can be shown that
the covenantor's successor knew or should have known that the
covenantor's agreement to pay was a part of the consideration for
the original purchase of the land, the burden should run with
the land to the successor.
3. Covenants Relating to the Duration of a Leasehold Interest
As a general proposition, covenants which in some way affect the duration of a leasehold interest should be deemed to run
both as to benefit and burden. This would be the normal assumption of any person taking a reversion or a leasehold as successor
in interest. Thus, it has been held that the benefit of a covenant
allowing the landlord to terminate the lease under certain described conditions runs to the landlord's successor in interest.1 54
Likewise, the benefit of a covenant requiring the tenant to surrender a portion of the leased premises if he does not find any
minerals upon it runs to the landlord's successor and the burden
runs to the tenant's assignee. 155 And the benefit as well as the
burden of a covenant providing for acceleration of rental upon
tenant's default runs. 15 5
The problem of the tenant's option to purchase the fee simple
contained in a lease at first blush would seem to present the
same issues but there has been more dispute about some aspects
of the rule. First, there seems to be no question that the burden
runs with the land into the hands of the new landlord. 1 5 7 The
split is on the question of whether the benefit of the option to
154. Lachman Bros. v. Muenzer, 143 Cal. App. 2d 520, 300 P.2d 295
(1956Y; 507 2Madison Ave. Realty Co. v. "Martin, 200 App. Div. 146, 192
N.Y.S.
(1922).v. American
155.'762
Lawhon
Cyanamid & Chem. Co., 216 Ark. 23, 223
S.W.2d 806 (1949).
156. Johns v. Winters, 251 Pa. 169, 96 A. 130 (1915).
157. Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P.2d 757 (1954); 2 A.L.P.,
supra note 130, § 9.4.
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purchase is personal to the tenant or runs with the land to his
assignee. The English cases take the position that the covenant
is personal and does not run with the land in the absence of an
express assignment. 15 The American authorities, on the other
hand, adhere to the view that the option passes automatically
with the tenancy interest. 159 This view seems preferable. Supporting the English approach is the argument that the right to
buy the property is just as beneficial to a nontenant as to a
tenant and therefore the right should be assumed to remain
with its original owner. However, this seems incorrect. In the
usual case where there is an option to purchase, a commercial
tenant is reserving this right to be in a position to continue the
advantages of his occupancy of that particular property indefinitely into the future. If he no longer occupies the premises
anyway, this reason no longer applies.
Suppose the option to buy contains a commitment by the
landlord to take back a purchase money mortgage from the tenant
for most of the purchase price. Should the benefit of the option
run into the hands of the assignee of the tenant for whose credit
the landlord has not bargained? One can find language in the
cases indicating that the benefit of such a covenant does not run
1
at all. 60
However, that is not strictly true, nor should it be.
The benefit of the option should run, but only if the new optionee
tenders cash in full instead of the mortgage.'01
V.

CONCLUSION

The rules of law about covenants running with the land are
so complex that only a very few specialists understand them.
Sometimes complexity in the law is necessary. In this particular case, it is not. If the cases in this area were solved by reference to the underlying policies instead of by reference to outworn
precedent, the rules would be reasonably simple to state and the
results more consonant with a sound system of private land use
control.

158. Woodall v. Clifton, 2 Ch. 257 (1905).
159. Bewick v. Mecharn, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P.2d 757 (1945); In re
Frayser's Estate, 401 Ill. 364, 82 N.E.2d 633 (1948); Shayeb v. Holland,
321 Mass. 429, 73 N.E.2d 731 (1947).
160. Rosello v. Hayden, 79 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1955).

161.

Frissell v. Nichols, 94 Fla. 403, 114 So. 431 (1927).

